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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
For centuries South Africa has been embroiled in racial conflict with human rights as 
one of the tragic casualties. 1 With the adoption of the lnterim2 and Final3 
Constitutions a decisive break was made with the past. One of the foundations laid 
to forge our new society based on equality and human dignity was the adoption of a 
Bill of Rights. Embodied in the clauses of the Bill of Rights are the values by which 
the people should guide their conduct in the future. 
That transformation is envisaged is clear from the pre- and postambles4 to the 
Interim Constitution. Anxiously we fret whether this transformation will be successful. 
That the Bill of Rights and the Constitutional Court'-s interpretation and application 
thereof will be crucial for transformation is beyond question. From this flows the all 
important question: " Who is bound by the Bill of Rights and, if so, under what 
circumstances?" 
The debate surrounding the above question is sometimes characterised as a debate 




In AZ.APO v the President of the Republic of South Africa 1996(4) SA 671 
(CC) at p 676 Justice Mahomed DP said the following " For decades South 
African history has been dominated by a deep conflict between a minority 
which reserved for itself all control over the political instruments of the state 
and the majority who sought to resist that domination. Fundamental rights 
became a major casualty of this conflict as the resistance of those punished 
by their denial was met by laws designed to counter the effectiveness of such 
resistance." 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa , Act no 200 of 1993. 
The Constitution of the Republic of South °Africa , Act no 108 of 1996 . 
The Preamble is found in the Interim Constitution before the first chapter 
while the Postamble appears just after clause 251 under the heading 
"National Unity and Reconciliation". 
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concepts do not do true justice to the nature of the debate. I believe that more 
specific questions should be posed, such as: 
1.1 Is the state bound to respect the rights embodied in the Bill of Rights? 
1.2 Is the judiciary bound by the Bill of Rights? 
1.3 Is the state bound when it relies on the common law as justification for 
its actions and the actions are in conflict with the Bill of Rights? 
1.4 Is a private person bound by the Bill of Rights if his actions are 
infringing on someone's rights? 
1.5 What should happen to common law rules if they are in conflict with 
the Bill of Rights? 
• It is instructive to note at the outset th,at the debate surrounding the application 
issue is settled as far as the following are concerned: 
5 
6 
a. The executive and legislative organs of th~ state are bound by the Bill 
of Rights. 
b Statutes, in a dispute between private parties and whi:m one of the 
parties relies on them, are subject to the Bill of Rights. 
c The common law, when relied on by the state in a dispute with a 
private citizen, is subject to constitutional review5. 
d The common law must, even in disputes between private parties, be 
developed to conform with the values of the Bill of Rights6. In this 
regard Judge Cameron said in Holomisa v Argus Newspaper Ltd 
that ... "The directive in section 35(3) in my view requires the 
Matthew Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of South Africa 1 ed Juta & Co 
Ltd (1996) on p10-1. , 
See section 35(3) of the Interim Constitution. · 
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• fundamental reconsideration of any common law rule that trenches on 
a fundamental right. "7 
From the.above it is clear that at the heart of the application debate is the dispute as 
to the manner in which the Bill of Rights should apply to a private person in a 
dispute with another private person where the state is in no manifestation involved.8 
Does. the Bill of Rights govern the relationships between private persons by 
providing the aggrieved party a cause of action?9 
In this thesis I will formulate a theory that can be used as a working legal tool to 
determine whether a fundamental right applies in a given situation. I will firstly 
examine the Interim Bill of Rights and thereafter I will formulate my theory. I will then 
examine the position in the United States of America and Canada and extract from 
their jurisprudence principles that can be used in South Africa. I will thereafter test 
this theory against the decisions of the South African courts and academic opinion. 
Finally, I will examine the Bill of Rights in the Final Constitution to deterry,ine to 




Holomisa v Argus Newspaper Ltd 1996 (6) BCLR 836 (W) at p 850 C. 
Chaskalson p 10-1. 
In Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another 1996(3) SA 850 (CC) at p 
891 I, Justice Mahomed remarked as follows: "The only residual area of 
. potential disagreement arises in the case where what is sought to be 
attacked is some or other rule of the common law in litigation between private 
parties not involving any legislative or executive authority". 
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CHAPTER 2 
GUIDELINES FOR THE INTERPRETATION OF 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
In this chapter I will attempt to answer the question: What guidelines should be 
used in interpreting the Interim Bill of Rights?10 
Section 98 (2) of the Interim Constitution11 states: 
"The Constitutional Court shall have jurisdiction in the Republic as the 
court of final instance over all matters relating to the interpretation of 
the provisions of this constitution." 
The judgments of the Constitutional Court are the fountain from which the meaning 
of chapter 3 and more specifically the application of the Bill of Rights will flow. In the 
Makwanvane 12 and Zuma 13 cases the Constitutional Court referred with approval to 






"The meaning of a right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter must be 
ascertained by an analysis of the purpose of such a guarantee; it was 
to be understood, in other words, in the light of the .interests it was 
See generally Gilbert Marcus Interpreting the Chapter on Fundamental 
Rights (1994) 1 O SAJHR 92. Chaskalson et al Chapter 11 by Kentridge J 
and Spitz D at page 11-1. Mt. Justice Brian Dickerson. The Judiciary - Law 
Interpreters or Law Makers. (1982-1983) 12 The Manitoba Law Journal 1. 
Section. 167(3)(a) of the Final Constitution read with section 167(7) also 
states that the Constitutional Court shall be the highest court in all matters 
involving the interpretation of the Final Constitution. 
State v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at p 403 C. 
State v Zuma and Others (1995) (2) SA 642 (CC) at p 651 E. 
R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd. (1985) 13 CRR 64 at p 103; and 18 DLR (4th) 321 
at p 395 - 6. 
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meant to protect. In my view this analysis is to be undertaken, and the 
purpose of the rights or freedom in question is to be sought, by 
reference to the character and larger objects of the Charter itself, to 
the language chosen to articulate the specific rights or freedom, to the 
historical origins of the concepts enshrined, and where applicable, to 
the meaning and purpose of the other specific rights and fr~edoms 
with which it is associated within the text of the Charter. The -
interpretation should be . . . a generous rather than a legalistic one, 
aimed at fulfilling the purpose of the guarantee and securing for 
individuals the full benefit of the Charter's protection." 
In S v Mhlungu 15 Justice Mahomed referred with approval to the following dictum in 
Government of the Republic of Namibia and Another v Cultura 2000 and Another. 16 
"A constitution is an organic instrument. . Although it is enacted in the 
form of a statute, it is sui generis. It must broadly, liberally and 
purposively be interpreted so as to avoid "the austerity of tabulated 
legalism" and so as to enable it to continue to play a creative and 
dynamic role in the expression and the achievement of the ideals and . 
aspirations of the nation, in the articulation of the values bonding its 
people and in disciplining its Government." 
The tenor of these judgments is also reflected in section 35(1) of the Interim 
Constitution, which states 
15 
16 
· "In interpreting the provisions of this Chapter a court of law shall 
promote the values which underlie an open and democratic society 
based on ·freedom and equality and shall, where applicable, have 
S v Mhlungu and Others 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC) at p 87 4 E. 
Government of the Republic of Namibia and Another v Cultura 2000 and 
Another 1994 (1) SA 407 (NmS) at p 418F-G. 
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regard to public. international law applicable to the protection of the 
rights entrenched in this Chapter, and may have regard to ~omparable 
foreign case law." 
suggest that in interpreting the provisions relevant to the application of the Bill of 
Rights the same principles should, be followed that are used for interpreting the 
rights themselves. The principles stated iri the passages quoted above should 
therefore be used in interpreting the provision -relevant to application of the Bill of 
Rights. 
In S v Makwanvane 17 Justice Chaskalson further decided that the debates which 
took place around the drafting of the constitution could be taken into account in 
interpreting the Constitution. 
,From the abqve-mentioned dicta the following guidelines for interpreting the text of 
the Interim Constitution to find the extent of the scope of application of the Bill of 
Rights can be extracted: 
17 
18 
a. The language chosen in the text of the Interim Constitution 
should firstly be examined. 
b. The purpose of the Bill of Rights with regard to _its scope of 
application should be determined. 18 
· c. In discovering this purpose, the character and larger objects of 
the Bill of Rights and the Constitution should be examined to 
see if these can throw light on the application issue. 
d The historical context of the Bill of Rights may be looked at. 
S v Makwanyane above at p 406 E. 
For an instructive discussion of this approach and its problems see Nicholas · 
Smith The Purpose Behind the Words (1996) 1.2 SAJHR 90 at p 96. 
-7 
e. The meaning and purpose , of other provisions in the 
Constitution which are relevant to the application issue should 
be looked at. 
f. The interpretation of the application provisions should be 
generous rather.than legalistic. 
g. The interpretation of the application provisions should be aimed 
at securing for the individual the full benefit of the protection of 
the Bill of Rights. 
h. The values which underlie our Constitution should be promoted. 
In the next chapter I will use the above principles to determine the scope of the 
application of the Interim Bill or Rights. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM BILL OF RIGHTS 
RELEVANT TO THE APPL/CATION DEBATE .19 
In this chapter I will examine the text of the Interim Constitution for indications as to 
how the Bill of Rights should be applied. The textual starting point for an 
examination of the application issue must be section 7. 
3.1 SECTION 7 
Section 7(1) states> 
"This chapter shall bind all legislative and executive organs of state at all 
levels of government." 
Section 7(2) states: 
"This Chapter shall apply to all law in force and all administrative decisions 
taken and acts performed-during the period of operation of this Constitution." 
' Those favouring the vertical and indirect horizontal application of the Interim Bill of 
Rights argue that traditionally bills of rights are intended to only protect the subject 
against the state. The emphatic statement in section 7(1 ), about who is bound, must 
therefore mean that only the parties mentioned in section 7,(1) are bound20. If the 
intention was to bind persons other than those mentioned in section 7(1 ), Parliament 
19 
20 
The Interim Bill of Rights is contained in Chapter 3 of Act No 200 of 1993; 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. The Interim Constitution came 
into operation on the 27th of April 1994. · 
Du Plessis v De Klerk p 877 C 
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could very easily have mentioned them as well. From the aforegoing it follows that 
the Judiciary and private persons are not bound by the Bill of Rights. 
Another argument advanced by the Verticalists is based on the exclusion of the 
judiciary in clause 7(1 ). The judiciary, they argue, was specifically excluded to 
ensure that court orders which d~al with common law disputes . between private 
persons are not subject to constitutional rev·iew. The purpose behind this exclusion 
is to ensure that purely private disputes and the law regulating such disputes should 
be insulated from the effect of the Bill of Rights. This being so, the intention of the 
legislature must have been that private persons in purely private disputes should not 
be subject to the Bill of Rights. 
Verticalists also argue that section 7(1) qualifies 7(2). The latter states the law to 
which the Bill of Rights applies and the former the entities to which the Bill of Rights 
. applies. Both hurdles must be crossed before the Bill of Rights can be relied upon 21 . 
After posing the question "what persons are bound by the chapter"22 , Justice 
Kentridge for example, in delivering the judgement for the majority of the 
Constitutional Court, finds that section 7(1) provides a plain answer23 . He remarks 
that entrenched bills of rights are ordinarily intended to protect citizens against 
legislative and executive action and: 
"the emphatic statement in s7(1) must mean that chapter 3 is intended to bind 
only the legislative and executive organs of state. Had the intention been to 
give it a more extended application that could have been readily 
expressed". 24 
The above-mentioned interpretations of section 7(1 ), I submit with respect, are not 
the only way in which this section can be read. Nowhere is it stated in the 





Martin Brassey Labour Relations under the New Constitution (1994) 10 
SAJHR 179 at p 186. 
Du Plessis v De Klerk at p 876 B. 
Du Plessis v De Klerk at p 877 B. 
Du Plessis v De Klerk at p.877 C 
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section 7(1 ). Secondly, the section can be interpreted as a clear rejection of the old 
Westminster principle that parliament and the executive are not bound in the sense 
that parliament can legislate on any matter it wishes to. Before the adoption of the 
Constitution the will of Parliament reigned supreme. This is no longer the case. This 
clause simply confirms this most important facet of the new order25• The meaning 
that Justice Kentridge therefore gives to this section must have its origin in other 
sections of the Interim Constitution. As will be shown in the rest of this chapter none 
of the sections in the Interim Constitution unequivocally supports the reading of 
"only" in section 7(1 ). 
This section must further be read in conjunction with section 7(2). Section 7(2) 
makes it clear that the Bill of Rights shall apply to all law in force. As was stated by 
Kriegler J: 
"There is no qualification, no exception. All means all. ·····:··The manifest 
intention of the drafters of this subsection was to cast the net as wide as 
possible. "26 
If, in terms of s7(2) all laws regulating the relationships between individuals are 
subject to the Bill of Rights then surely the individuals as carriers of the rights and 
obligations will automatically be subject to the Bill of rights in terms of s7(2) alone. 
From Section 7(2)' it can be concluded that the intention of the framers was that the 
Bill should have direct horizontal application. 
In conclusion I suggest that section 7(1) and 7(2) can support both the horizontal 
and vertical positions in this debate. 
3.2 SECTION 4(1) 
Section 4( 1 ) states that: . 
25 See Chaskalson at p 10-33 and also Motala v University of Natal 1995 (3) 
BCLR 374 (D) at p 381E. . 
26 Du Plessis v De Klerk p 913 F. 
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"This constitution shall be the supreme law o~ the Republic and any law or act 
inconsistent with its provisions shall, unless otherwise provided expressly or 
by necessary implication in this Constitution, be of no force or effect." 
The phrase "aoy law or act inconsistent with its provisions shall ... : : .. be of no force 
or effect" suggests thaf the Bill of Rights should be applied in a horizontal manner. 
The Afrikaans text uses the word "handeling". A "handeling" can be performed by a 
person totally unconnected to the State. If it was the intention that only the State 
should be bound by the Bill of Rights, the word "act" should have been qualified by, 
for example, "any act of an organ of State". 
This section I suggest is a further pointer in the direction that the Bill of Rights 
should have direct horizontal application. 
3.3 SECTION 4 (2) 
This section states: 
"This constitution shall bind all legislative, executive and judicial organs of 
state." 
In direct contrast to Section 7(1) this section binds the Judiciary. This difference can 
be explained by acknowledging that different committees had different ideas about 
the direct horizontal application of the Bill of Rights. On a reading of this section 
alone it is clear that the Judiciary is bound by the Bill of Rights. If that is so the 
argument advanced by the verticalists27 that the Judiciary was specifically excluded 
so that section 7(1) can have a vertical application only, loses all its merit. I submit 
that the intention of the Legislature whether the Judiciary should be subject to the 
Bill of Rights is, to say the least, uncertain. and controversial. If this is so the 
omission of the Judiciary from section 7(1) cannot be said to be an indication that 
27 See page 9 above. 
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the legislature intended to insulate common law private disputes from impact of the 
Bill of Rig_hts. It cannot be argued that the Judiciary was omitted to exclude a direct 
application of the Bill of Rights. 
The verticalists however argue that the difference between 7(1) and 4(2) indicates 
that the Judiciary is bound by the constitution but. not in the same manner as the 
executive and the legislature. 28 No indication is however given how the Judiciary is 
bound differently. I suggest that none can be given as both sections use the same-
word namely "bound". If "bound" in section 7 means that the executive has got a 
legal obligation not to infringe on a person's fundamental rights surely "bound" in 
section 4 must place the same obligation on the Judiciary. 
I submit that the impact of this section on section 7 is that both sections support the 
conclusion that the Bill of Rights should have direct horizontal application. 
3.4 SECTION 33(2) 
This section states: 
"Save as provided for in subsection (1) or any other provision of this 
Constitution , no law, whether a rule of the common law, customary law 
or legislation, shall limit any right entrenched in this Chapter. 
This section quite clearly states that no law shall limit any fundamental right. This 
must surely also include the law applicable to a purely private dispute. I suggest that 
this is another pointer in the direction of direct horizontal application. 29 The 
verticalists can however point to the words " Save as provided for in ..... any other 
provision of this Constitution". The argument is that section 7(1) is such" another 
28 
29 
Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd 1996 (6) BCLR 836 (W) at p 843 E. 
Kriegler J proclaims in Du Plessis v De Klerk on p 914 D "If the chapter were 
intended to operate only vertically , or only indirectly horizontally, why was it 
necessary or indeed appropriate, to declaim -the preservation of rights in such, 
unqualified terms?" 
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provision" and therefore the common law when in operation between two private 
persons may limit a person's fu~damental rights. 
This is a circular argument as the conclusion is used to justify the conclusion i.e. 
that the Bill of Rights only apply in a vertical manner. In short there is no "other 
provision of this constitution" which unequivocally states that the Bill of Rights shall 
have vertical application only. 
3.5 SECTION 33(4) 
This section states; 
"This chapter shall not preclude measures designed to prohibit unfair 
discrimination by bodies and persons other than those bound in terms of 
section 7(1 )." 
Justice Kentridge calls this clause 
"Another strong indication that a general horizontal application was not 
intended ........ If Chapter 3 has general horizontal application who can the 
bodies and persons be who are not bound?"30 
In response it can be argued that the bodies and persons not bound in terms of 
section 7(1) are the Judiciary, which is bound in terms of clause 4(2), and private 
persons, who are bound in terms of clause 7(2). In my view the purpose of this 
clause is to regulate the situation where the state passes a law prohibiting unfair 
discrimination by a private person. Such a law might find itself open to constitutional 
attack on the basis that the new law infringes a constitutional right. This clause will 
30 Du Plessis·v De Klerk at p 877 F. Judge Cameron also sees this clause as 
an indication that the Bill of Rignts does not have direct horizontal 
,application. See Holimisa v Argus· Newspapers Ltd at p .843 F. See also 
Martin Brassey at p184. 
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make it more likely that the said law will pass the requirements of section 33(1) as 
the Constitution in 33 (4) specifically states that such measures are authorised . 
. 3.6 SECTION 35 (3) 
This Section states: 
) 
"In the interpretation of any law and the application and development of the 
common law and customary law, a court shall have due regard to the spirit, 
purport and objects of this chapter." 
The verticalists see this clause as very convincing support for their cause that the 
fundamental rights should not have direct horizontal application. They argue that if 
the fundamental rights have direct horizontal application· this clause would be 
superfluous. 31 
The above reading of this clause is however not the only one. This clause can also · 
be read to mean that the courts must also have regard to the spirit and objects of 
Chapter 3 in interpreting and developing the common law in disputes in which no . 
constitutional right is raised. 32 
Verticalists further argue that this clause bears such an uncanny resemblance to the 
German principle of mittelbare Drittwirkung that the insertion could not have been 
coincidental. The intention of the legislature is thus clear. The position in Germany 
regarding the application of their Bill of Rights should be replicated here. Therefore 
there should be no direct application of the fundamental rights in disputes between 
private persons. 
At first glance I agree that this clause is a very strong pointer to a mittelbare 
Drittwirkung interpretation only. The argument that this section was inserted by the . 
drafters to allow for the radiation of the values embodied in the Bill into the legal 
31 
32 
Justice Kentridge in Du Plessis v De Klerk at p 877 G. 
Justice Kriegler in Du Plessis v De Klerk at p 916 A-C. 
I 
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relationship between private people to my mind does not adequately take into 
account the purpose of the Constitution as expressed in the Preamble and 
Declaration. These sections call for a transformation of a society. I doubt whether 
this transformation. can be achieved by infusing the values of the Constitution into 
the open-ended concepts of the common law. At least the direct horizontal 
application of the fundamental rights has a greater chance .of effecting the 
transformation that the Constitution desires. 
3.7 SECTION 35(1) 
This section reads as follows: 
"In interpreting the provisions of this chapter a court of law shall promote the 
values which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and 
equality and shall where apppcable have regard to public international law 
applicable to the protection of rights entrenched in this chapter and may have 
regard to comparable foreign case law." 
I suggested in chapter 2 that this clause instructs the court to follow the purposive . 
approach when interpreting the provision of the Constitution relevant to the 
application debate. This clause should be applied in conjunction with the principles 
; of interpretation as set out in chapter 2. 
The larger objects and character of the Interim Constitution is to transform the whole 
of the South African society, not just the State. With these in mind the provision 
relevant to the application of the Bill of Rights should be given an interpretation that 
favours a transformation of society. For example racism wherever it manifests itself 
in the society should be eradicated. The direct horizontal application of the Bill of 
Rights is much more likely to have that effect than the vertical or indirect horizontal 
application of the fundamental rights. 
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The historical context of the Bill of Rights may also be looked at. How does this 
impact on the relevant application provisions? Justice Kriegler says th~ following; 
"Our past is not· merely one of repressive use of State power. It is one of 
persistent institutionalised subjugation and exploitation of a voiceless and 
largely defenceless majority by a determined and privileged minority. The 
untold suffering and injustice of which the postscript speaks do not refer only 
to the previous years, not only to Bantu education, group areas, security and 
the similar legislative tools used by the previous government." 
The historical context of the Bill of Rights implores us to interpret the relevant 
application provision in such a manner that the subjugation and exploitation of the 
Black people be addressed. This, in my view favours an interpretation that the Bill of 
Rights should have direct horizontal application. 
The interpretation of the application provisions must also be aimed at securing for 
. . 
the individual the full benefit of the protection of the Bill of Rights. Thus, where 
section 13 states that every person shall have the right to personal privacy, the full 
benefit of protection of this right means that both the state and private persons have 
the legal obligation to respect that right. 
In interpreting the relevant application clauses the values which underlie the Interim 
Constitution should also be promoted. What are these values? These include, in my 
view, dignity, equality, democracy, pluralism and liberty . Once again I suggest that 
a direct horizontal application will give a fuller expression to these avowed purposes 
of the Interim Constitution than the interpretation that the verticalists propose. 
3.8 SECTION 232 (4) 
Section 232 ( 4) provides: 
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"In interpreting this constitution a provision in any schedule, including the 
provisions under the heading "National unity and Reconciliation", to this 
constitution shall not. by reason only of the fact that it is contained in a 
schedule, have a lesser status than any other provision of this constitution 
which is not contained in a schedule, and such a provision shall for all 
purposes be deemed to form part of the substanc~ of this constitution." 
One of the principles of interpreting a bill of rights is that the purpose of the rights 
and the purpose of the application of those rights as intended by the legislature 
should be taken into account. These purposes can be discovered by examining the 
character and larger objects of the bill of rights. These larger objects and purposes 
are set out in the pre- and post-ambles. This section therefore gives constitutional 
authority that the above-mentioned approach should be followed. When the 
declaration therefore states that the Constitution provides a historic bridge between 
the past of a deeply divided soc:;iety of untold suffering and a future founded on 
human rights, such a statement. carries the same. weight as the statement in, for 
example, section 9 which states that every person shall have the right to life. It 
further indicates that the purpose of the Bill of Rights should be understood in the 
context of the other relevant provisions of the Bill like the Preamble and the 
Declaration of National Unity and Reconciliation. 33 
3.9 DECLARATION OF NATIONAL UNITY AND RECONCILIATION 
The declaration states the following: 
33 
"This Constitution provides a historic bridge between the past of a deeply 
divided society characterised by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice 
and a future founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy· and 
In this thesis the declaration of national unity and reconciliation appearing 
after section 251 in the Interim Constitution will be referred to as. "the 
Declaration" or "postamble". 
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peaceful coexistence and development opportunities for all South Africans 
irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex." 
This declaration speaks of a historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided 
society and a society based on human dignity. It speaks of the "reconstruction of 
society". This i_s an express indication that the Bill of Rights should also have a 
horizontal application. The declaration addresses the whole society and not just the 
state. The declaration speaks of the reconstruction of society. The intention clearly 
is to redefine the relationship not only between the state and its citizens but also 
between citizens. 
The declaration further states that the Bill of Rights should have horizontal 
application when in no unclear terms it states as follows: 
"The adoption of this constitution lays the secure foundation for the people of 
South Africa to transcend the divisions and strife of the past, which generated 
gross violations of human rights, the transgression of humanitarian principles 
in violent conflicts and a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge." 
These aims speak profoundly of a vision of a changed society not just of a modified 
state. The declaration therefore supports the view that the Bill should have direct 
horizontal application. 
3.10 THE PREAMBLE 
In S v Mhlungu , Justice Sachs said the following about the preamble: 
"The preamble in particular should not be dismissed as a mere aspirational 
and throat-clearing exercise of· 1ittle interpretative value. It connects up, 
reinforces and underlies all of the text that .follows. It helps to establish the 
basic design of the Constitution and indicates its fundamental purpose. (See 
the concluding passqge.) This is not a case of making the Constitution mean 
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what we like, but mean what our framers wanted it to mean; We gather their 
intention not from our subjective wishes, but from lo,oking at the d~cument as 
a whole." 34 
This preamble states: 
"Whereas there is a need to create a· new order in which all South Africans 
will be entitled to a common South African citizenship in a sovereign and 
democratic constitutional state, in which there is equality between men and 
women and people of all races so that all citizens shall be able to enjoy and 
exercise their fundamental rights and freedom." 
These words point to a new order. The purpose of the Bill of Rights is to bring 
about a new society with values different from the old one. The preamble desires 
that there be. equality of people, of all races, and between men and women. The 
purpose that can be learned from this preamble is clearly that all people should be 
bound by the constitution and not just the organs of the state. 
3.11. THE HISTORY OF SECTION 7 
The discussions by Du Plessis & Corder as well as the South African Law 
Commission35 as to the genesis of this section, show that it was produced after 
extensive negotiation and debate. This Section became the focal point of the 
"application debate" between the drafters. Obviously all the other provisions could 
not be changed to reflect each cut and thrust in the application debate. It emerges 
· that the people who drafted and participated in the application debate settled for a 
vertical application with provision for value radiation into the private sphere. To 
conclude, the history of this section points clearly in favour of a vertical application 
of the Bill of Rights. 
34 
35 
S v Mhlungu and Others at p 87 4 E. 
Du Plessis & Corder Understanding South Africa's Transitional Bill of Rights 
1 ed Juta & Co Ltd (1994) at p 111. The South African Law Commission Final . 
Report on Group and Human Rights Project 58 (1994) at p 120. 
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However these drafters were not the persons who passed the Constitution in 
parliament. Their intentions could never be the intention of the legislature. · I 
therefore feel that although the historical argument is very convincing in favour of 
verticalisrn, the history of sections 7 and 35 can never be conclusive proof of the 
intention of the legislature. 
3.12 CONCLUSION 
I am of the view that the text points in different directions at the same time. 36 Some 
sections read by themselves or in conjunction with others clearly support the direct 
horizontal application of the Bill of Rights. Others again the vertical application. The 
text as a whole however interpreted in the light of the guidelines set out in chapter 2 
to my mind favours a direct horizontal application. This "either-or" approach 
however is not the only one. In the next chapter I will examine non textual argument 
for and against the different application approaches and suggest a method by which 
the textual conflict may be resolved. 
36 Cheadle H and Davis D The Application of the 1996 Constitution in the 
Private Sphere. (1997) 13 SAJHR 44 at p 50 states " The fact is that the 
political compromise, left the language open to differing interpretations." 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESOLUTION OF THE TEXTUAL CONFLICT 
In this chapter I will suggest a method by which the textual conflict of the provisions 
relevant to the application of the Interim Bill of Rights can be resolved. As concluded 
in the previous chapter the text of the Interim Constitution does not without. any 
doubt favour either the horizontal or vertical application of the Bill of Rights. I will 
first, however, explore whether non textual arguments can lead one to conclude that 
a particular applicatibn theory should prevail. 
4.1 THE HISTORICAL ARGUMENT 
Verticalists argue that from a historical perspective most constitutions only protect 
the individual against infringement of its constitutional rights by the state. Why 
should we have a different approach in the absence of clear textual indicators? 
The horizontalists can argue that this statement is no longer valid. Woolman points 
\ > 
out that direct horizontal application tias taken place in Ireland and New Zealand. 37 
According to De Wet the Italian Constitution guarantees a wage right which has · 
direct horizontal application38• Woolman and Davis39 also point out that 




Stuart Woolman Defamation, Application and the Interim Constitution (1996) 
113 SALJ 428 at pages 441 to 443. 
Erika De Wet Indirect Drittwirkung and the Application clause: A reply to 
Johan De Waal by Erika de Wet (1995) 11 SAJHR 610 at pages 617 and 
618. 
Woolman S and Davis D The Last· Laugh: Du Plessis v De Kl erk, Classical 
Liberalism, Creole Liberalism and the Application of Fundamental Rights 
under the Interim and the Final Constitutions. (1996) 12 SAJHR 361 at p 
374. 
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well as state power. The pre'." and post amble further provide clear textual indicators 
that some rights should have direct horizontal application. 
4.2 THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY ARGUMENT 
The verticalists advance the argument that the preferred political theory to express 
human fulfilment and. ultimately human dignity is Classical Liberalism. This theory 
teaches that individuals have natural inalienable rights which the state may not 
violate. The state should refrain from intruding in the private sphere of individuals. 
Woolman and Davis40 point out that the Classical Liberal theory does not take into 
account the preconditions necessary for a life of human dignity and that our life is 
largely constructed for us by the communities we live in as well as by the institutions 
we are part of. I agree with this approach. My view is that freedom can never by 
itself provide a life of dignity. What is required is a free private sphere infused with 
va!ue judgements. To provide a life of human dignity the values underlying the Bill of 
Right should become part of the fabric of our society and should infuse the 
decisions we make every day. 
4.3 THE WORKLOAD ARGUMENT 
Verticalists further argue that if we have direct horizontal application the 
Constitutional Court will be flooded with litigation. This kind of argument is in my 
view nothing more than speculation. Once the court has ruled on a specific issue 
and the common law is clarified, the workload will be the same as with any other 
common law rule. Any system of human endeavour, including judicial review, 
should be organic and flexible. Even if there is a flood of litigation in the beginning 
a way will be found to deal with it. In my view this can never be a valid argument 
why the Bill of Rights should not have direct horizontal application. 
40 Woolman S and Davis D The Last Laugh at pages 382 - 400. 
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4.4 THE COINCIDENTAL ARGUMENT -
Horizontalists argue that if the Bill of rights applies in a vertical manner it will be 
purely coincidental whether a fundamental right applies in a dispute between two 
litigants. If the relationship has been legislated upon then the fundamental right will 
apply . If not, and only the comm~n law applies, then ~he fundame.ntal right will not 
apply. The horizontalists further criticise that in any event the common law will be 
subject to constitutional review if the state is a party to the dispute and relies on it. 
This will lead to one common law for the state and another for the rest of us. 
4.5 THE STATE ACTION ARGUMENT 
Horizontalists point out that it is in the nature of constitutional review to weigh up 
competing values and in doing so draw the boundaries between the different 
competing fundamental rights. This approach also ventilates a discussion of the 
values and interests fundamental rights protect or do not protect . In an open and 
democratic society this discussion is crucial. If the vertical approach is followed this 
debate will not take place as far as the relationship between private ·individuals is 
concerned. All the courts will do is to try and find if the state is present in what is 
really the private sphere, thus completely bypassing the above mentioned debate. 
4.6 COUNTER MAJORITARIANISM ARGUMENT 
Verticalists point out that there is a contradiction between a democratic system of 
government and the institution of constitutional review. Judges are not elected by 
the majority · of the people. Because the concepts used to describe fundamental 
rights are open ended and capable' of different interpretations, Judges are able to 
regulate the relationships between private people according to their own ideas of 
what is right. We will, basically speaking, have philosopher kings. This is a complex 
issue which cannot be properly discussed here. I must however point out that the 
same argument can be levelled against the vertical approach as well. In terms of the 
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vertical theory the legislature and the executive will also be subject to ccmstitutional 
review. 
After listing the above argument I must conclude that both schools of thought offer 
convincing arguments for their specific application theory. In my opinion the 
arguments in favour of direct horizontal application outweighs the ones in favour of 
vertical application. 
4.7 RESOLUTION OF THE TEXTUAL CONFLICT 
An important point not to lose sight of in the application debate is that the debate 
is not so much a debate about horizontal versus vertical application but more about 
the manner in which the fundamental right should be applied between private 
persons. The conflict is between whether a person in a private dispute can rely on 
the Bill of Rights for a cause of action or a defence or whether he can only argue 
that the values underlying the Bill of Rights have so infused the open-ended 
concepts of the common law, that the common law should be developed by the 
courts so as to provide him with a remedy or a defence. The conflict is therefore not 
so stark and I feel one can return to the text of the Constitution and tools of 
" interpretation for an answer. 
This conflict may be resolved in the same manner that Justice Sachs resolved the 
conflict in the State v Mhlungu case between section 241 (8) of the Interim 
Constitution and its Chapter 3 rights. He stated in that case: 
· "This means that the two sets of provisions must be read together as 
part of the total constitutional scheme, not separately as autonomous 
free standing Clauses. If there is overlap and collision of material 
between the two provisions, the essential purpose of each must be 
discussed and weighted so that an appropriate resolution based on 
balance between the two can be achieved. This involves a species of 
interactive proportionality. It moves the nature of the enquiry from the 
so-called plain meaning of the words looked at on their own or even in 
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context, to the interactive purpose of different provisions read 
together." 41 
From the discussion in chapter 3 it is clear that there is a collision and overlap of 
material amongst the provisions impacting on the application of the Bill of Rights. 
~ection 7(1) read with section 35(3) pull in the direction of vertical applic<;1tion 
supplemented by indirect horizontal application. The Declaration, Preamble, and the 
other provisions discussed in chapter 3 point towards a direct horizontal application 
of the Bill of Rights. This requires that the essential purpose of each be discussed 
and weighted. 
The essential purpose of Section 7(1) read with section 35(3) is to protect the 
citizen against oppressive state intervention and to create a sphere of private 
conduct where persons may act unrestrained by the values imposed by non-elected 
judges in their interpretation of the Bill of Rights. 
The essential purpose of the Declaration, Preamble, Schedule 4 and the other 
provisions discussed in chapter 3 is to bring about the transformation of the old 
order and to create a· new society with values based on human dignity, equality and 
democracy. 
What is then the interactive purpose of the different provisions read together? The 
interactive purpose will be a purpose that will, while infringing to some extent on the 
essential purpose of each set of provisions, still give expression to the essential 
aims of each set of provisions. The interactive purpose will be one that gives 
recognition to essential aims of Parliament to create a new society as well as the 
essential aims of Parliament to create private sphere for person to live in. 
Can transformation be achieved whilst still maintaining a free private sphere? I do 
believe it can and in the following manner. 
41 S v Mhlungu at p 912 A. 
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Locked in the concept of a transformed society is the notion of a society with values 
different from the old one. However not all the values of the new order should be 
different from the values in the old one. There will be a set of values that will be the 
same in both orders. These values are not essential for transformation. The values 
however that were absent from the old order and envisaged for the new one will be 
essential for transformation. These values I will call essential values. 
Fundamental rights that can advance and promote essential values will assist the 
envisaged transformation. These rights only should therefore have direct horizontal 
application. Rights which only promote values that are not essential for 
transformation should have vertical application only. 
On a careful reading of the Preamble, Declaration and Schedule 4 it is clear that 
Section 8 of the Bill of Rights for example will promote essential values and should 
therefore have direct horizontal application. 
The above then is the interactive purpose of all the clauses impacting on the 
application of the bill of rights. This test I will call the Values Test and it is set out 
below. 
4.8 THE VALUES TEST 
The following are the principles that make up the Values Test: 
· (a) The values which the Constitution and more specifically the Bill 
of Rights, Preamble and Declaration desire for the new order 
should be identified. 
(b) It should then be determined whether those values were absent 
in the old order. If they were absent then the values are ones 
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that can transform (?Ur society. These I will call the essential 
values. 42 
(c) Next it should be determined whether the right in question can 
promote the essential values in the factual context of the case. 
( d) If the right can promote essential values then it becomes an 
right essential for transformation and. for the society envisaged 
by the Constitution and should be applied in a direct horizontal 
manner.43 
(f) The application of these essential rights should be limited by 
the values that other rights promote, as well as the limitation 
clause, section 33. 
(e) The rights not promoting essential values should have vertical 
and indirect horizontal application only. 
The above test, apart from providing a principled approach to 'the application of 
specific rights, also have the following advantages. The Values based approach will 




In Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Limited Cameron J defines these values at 
p 844 G to be equality, democracy, governmental openness and 
accountability. 
Botha H The Values and Principles underlying the 1993 Constitution ( 1994) 
9 SAPL 233 at p 233 defines these values as national unity, limited 
government, liberty, equality and pluralism. 
Support for this test can be found in the judgement of Justice Madala in the 
matter of Du Plessis v De Klerk at p 923 F to 926 E. For example at page 
925 E the learned Judge states " If the proposition is accepted that the basic 
concern of the Constitution is to transform the South African society and the 
legal system into one that upholds democratic principles and human rights 
between , inter alia, the State and the individual and between individuals inter 
se, there must be instances which call, in so far as private relationships 
between individuals are concerned, for the direct application of the provisions 
of Chapter 3 between such individuals." 
Cheadle H and Davis D The Application of the 1996 Constitution in the 
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Cockrell points out45 that there are two types of reasoning, namely substantive 
reasoning ar:id formal reasoning. The author states that a substantive reason for a 
decision is a moral, economic, political, institutional or other social consideration. In 
contrast, the author continues, a formal reason is a legally authoritative reason on 
which judges are required to base a decision and which overrides any 
countervailing substantive reason arising at t~e point of applicati<:m . The person 
who makes the decisions when resolving a dispute by formal reason does not have 
to go beyond the rule itself and investigate the substantive reasons for its decision. 
If the courts engage in a process of evaluating the underlying values of the 
Constitution and can justify the application of the Bill of Rights in the light of those 
values, the decision will be one made after a process of substantive reasoning was 
followed . Such decisions will give expression to the aims of the Constitution to 
transform our society. As was stated by Cockrell ; 
"an engagement with the substantive vision of law which is part of 
Chapter 3 of the Constitution would be likely to produce' a healthy 
spill-over effect in the context of private-law adjudication in the 
horizontal realm"46 
As some rights will apply to private disputes the Values Test will bring our 
Constitution in line with other modern constitutions and international instruments 
As only the essential rights will have direct horizontal application the workload on 
the courts should be less. 
The counter majoritarian argument against direct horizontal application will lose 
some of its force. Judges can now, when they impose their values on private 
45 
46 
Private Sphere (1997) 13 SAJHR 44 at p 60 states " The fundamental 
values of the Constitution should act as guidelines to which rights are 
suitable to promote application because they enhance the kind of society 
envisaged in the Constitution." 
Cockrell A Rainbow Jurisprudence. (1996) 12 SAJHR 1 at p 5. 
Cockrell at p 37. 
_; 
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persons, point to the avowed aims of the Constitutions to transform society and use 
this aim as justification for their interference in private affairs. 
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Chapter 5 
THE NORTH AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 
In this chapter I will examine the judgments of the Supreme Courts of the United 
States of America and Canada47 and analyse how they have dealt with the 
application issue. I will concentrate on the principles formulated in the case law and 
investigate whether the Values Test that I proposed in the previous chapter should 
be modified. 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
5.1 THE AMERICAN STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
The Constitution of the United States, and more specifically the Amendments 
thereto, contain provisions _protecting the rights of individuals. For example the First 
Amendment states: 
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech or of the press; or of the right of people to peaceably assemble 
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." 
. Also, the Fourteenth Amendment states: 
47 
"Section 1. All persons born or naturalised in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and 
of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any 
Section 35(1) of the Interim Constitution and section 39(1 )(c) of the Final 
Constitution states that in the interpretation of the provisions relevant to the. . . 
application debate the court may consider comparable foreign case law. 
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law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by ·appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article." 
Unlike the Canadian, German or South African Bills of Rights there is no clause 
specifically dealing with the issue of the application of the Bill. The question, to 
whom does the Bill apply, can only be answered by examining the manner in which 
the rights themselves are described. For example in the First Amendment it is 
stated that "Congress shall make no law .. : ... ". The Fourteenth Amendment states 
"No State shall make or enforce any law ...... ". The Supreme Court therefore has to 
determine who is bound by the Bill of Rights by examining the words used to 
describe the right itself. 
5.2 AMERICAN CASE LAW 
5.2.1 THE CIVIL RIGHTS CASES48 
The scope of the application of the Bill of Rights was first, extensively treated by 
Justice Bradley in the civil rights cases. In 1875 Congress passed the Civil Rights 
Act. Section 1 of this Act stated:49 
48 
49 
"That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be 
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, 
advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on 
land or water, theatres, and other places of public amusement; subject 
only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and 
The Civil Rights Cases 109 US 3; 3 S Ct 18; 27 L ed 835 (1883). 
Civil Rights Cases 3 S Ct p 20. 
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applicable alike to citizens of every race and colour,· regardless of any 
previous condition of servitude." 
Stanley, Nicols, and Ryan amongs others, were convicted in the lower Courts of 
committing acts prohibited in terms of this Section. The accused appealed and 
when these matters were heard in the Supreme Co~rt they argued that their 
convictions should be set aside on the grounds that Congress had exceeded its 
powers in terms of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when it passed the Civil 
Rights Act. 
In two of the cases, United States v Stanley50 and United States v Nicols, 51 the 
accused were convicted of denying persons of colour the accommodation and 
privileges of an inn or hotel. In United States v Ryan52 and United States v 
Singleton53 the accused were found guilty of denying persons of colour the 
privileges and accommodation of a theatre. The issue to be decided was whether 
the Federal Government had the constitutional authority to pass the Civil Rights Act. 
Does Congress have the constitutional power under the 14th Amendment to make 
such a law? After quoting the 1st Section of the Fourteenth Amendnient Justice 
Bradley stated that the 14th amendment has vertical application only;: 
"It is State action of a particular kind that is prohibited. Individual 
invasion of individual rights is not the subject matter of the 
Amendment. It has a deeper and broader scope. It nullifies and 
makes void all State legislation and State action of every kind which 
· ....... denies to any of them the equal protection of the law. "54 
Justice Bradley also made the following illustrative remarks which throw light on how 






The Civil Rights Cases. 109 US 3; 3 S Ct 18; 27 Led 835 (1883). 
The Civil Rights Cases. 109 US 3; 3 S Ct 18; 27 Led 835 (1883). 
The Civil Rights Cases. 109 US 3; 3 S Ct 18; 27 Led 835 (1883). 
The Civil Rights Cases .. 109 US 3; 3 S Ct 18; 27 Led 835 (188~). -
Civil Rights Cases at p 21 
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"[C]ivil rights, such as are guaranteed by the constitution against state 
aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals, 
unsupported by state authority in the shape of laws, customs, or 
judicial or executive proceedings. The wrongful act of an individual, 
unsupported by any such authority, is simply a private wrong, or a 
crime of that individual; 55 
As Congress only had the power to make laws protecting its citizens from the 
infringements of its rights by the State, Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act was too wide 
and was therefore declared unconstitutional and void. 
The principles that one can deduce from this decision are the following: 
a. The Fourteenth Amendment applies only to state legislation and state action. 
b. It does not protect a person from the invasion of his rights by anothe.r person ' 
who has no connection with the state. 
c. It applies to state officers, administrative, executive or judicial. 
d. It applies to acts done under state authority. 
These principles ignore that racism is not just practised by the State but is to a large 
extent a social problem. No constitutional protection is provided under these 
principles as long as the state is not involved. The above approach is also a formula 
approach56 which does not require the court to ventilate the values of different rights 
in different factual situations. 
55 
56 
Civil Rights Cases at p 25. 
William W Van Alstyne and Kenneth L Karst State Action (1961) 14 Stanford 
Law Review 3 at p 58. 
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5.2.2 THE TEXAS PRIMARY CASES 
The State primaries are a process whereby political parties elect their candidates to 
be put on the national ballot for election to Congress. From the people on the ballot 
the citizens of the particular state elect their representatives in Congress. In the 
c~se of Nixon v Herndon,57 Nixon, a black man was refused the right to vote in a 
Democratic Party Primary for the State of Texas. At the time a Texas statute stated 
that: 
"In no event shall a Negro be eligible to participate in a Democratic 
Party Primary election in the State of Texas." 
The Supreme Court was obliged to determine whether this Texas statute was a 
breach of Nixon's constitutional rights under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments. The Fifteenth Amendment specifically states: 
"Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not 
be denied or abridged by the Unites States or by any State on account 
of race, colour, or previous condition of servitude. 
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation." 
Without even considering the ambit of the Fifteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court 
found that the State of Texas had infringed Nixon's right to equal protection granted 
to him in terms of the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment. 
In reaction to this judgment, the Texas State legislature re-enacted the article and 
gave to the State Executive Committee of the Democratic Party the power to 
prescribe who could be members of the party and who could vote in the primaries. 
The Democratic Party by means of the State Executive Committee passed a 
57 Nixon v Herndon 273 US 536; 71 L ed 759; 47 S Ct 446. 
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resolution that only white democrats and no one else could participate in any 
election of candidates for the Congress ballot. Nixon was again refused the right to 
vote and again brought an action for damages based on an infringement of his 
constitutional rights. 58 The Supreme Court ruled that the test to be applied was 
whether the Committee operated as a representative of the state in the discharge of 
the state's authority. !he Court found that it did and that· for the purpose of the 
constitution the actions of the Executive Committee of a political party were deemed 
to be that of the state. 
After this defeat the State Executive Committee delegated its powers to prescribe 
the requirements for the right to vote in primaries to the State Convention of the 
Democratic Party. In 1932 the State Convention adopted the following resolution: 59 
"Be it resolved that all white citizens of the State of Texas who are 
qualified to vote under the Constitution and laws of the state shall be 
eligible to membership in the Democratic Party and as such entitled to 
participate in its deliberations." 
In terms of this resolution a county clerk refused a Negro, Mr Grovey, the ballot, 
based solely on the fact that Grovey was black. The Supreme Court distinguished 
Grovey from the Nixon case and found that, unlike the Executive Committee, a state 
convention of a party was not an organ of state. Grovey was denied the right to 
vote. 60 
The issue was once again raised and finally settled in Smith v Allwright. 61 Smith, a 
Negro citizen, was refused a ballot to vote in the Texas primaries of the Democratic 
Party. Relying on the above quoted resolution of the • Democratic Party's State 





Nixon v Condon 286 US 73; 76 Led 984; 52 S Ct 484. 
Smith v Allwright 88 L ed 987 at p 993. · 
Grovey v Townsend 295 US 45; 79 L ed 1292; 55 S Ct 622. 
Smith v Allwright 88 Led 987. -
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damages for the infringement of his constitutional rights as embodied in the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 
It was once again argued that the Democratic Party primaries were elections 
conducted by the Democratic Party through its party officials for the selection. of the 
party nominees in the ge~eral election. These, were not elections c;;onducted by the · 
State of Texas. The Democratic Party was a voluntary organisation. The primaries 
are political affairs handled by the party and not by the government. The majority 
judgment was delivered by Justice Reed. The judge first noted and discussed the 
history of the cases and concluded that in United States v Classic, 62 the Supreme 
Court had found that the whole process of electing officials to government positions 
should be seen as one process. Justice Reed found that this whole process was 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The resolution of a political party on the 
facts of this case was thus viewed as "state action. "63 
The following principles canbe deduced from these cases 
a. The whole election process is the exclusive and traditional function of the 
state. 
b. The state, by delegating its governmental functions to private persons or 
organisations, cannot escape the limitations imposed on it by the constitution. 
Such private persons and organisations will be deemed to be agents of the 
state and their actions to be state actions. 
c. Private persons, when fulfilling traditional government functions, will be 




The following have been seen as traditional government functions: 
United States v Classic 313 US 299; 85 Led 368; 61 S Ct 1031. 
Smith v Allwright at p 995. 
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1 . The operation of election systems; 
2. The governing of cities or towns; 
3. The operation of public places such as parks; 
e. This test became known as the public functions doctrine and is an extension 
of the State Action Doctrine. 
In my view the approach of the court should have been to weigh the right of a 
person to belong to a political party of his choice and to vote for candidates of his 
choice against the right of the members of a political party to freedom of association. 
Instead the court has to do fancy footwork to find the presence of the state in the 
workings of a political party. 
5.2.3 THE MARCH CASE 64 
The town of Chickasaw in the State of Alabama was owned by the Gulf Shipping -
; 
Corporation, a private company incorporated in terms of the laws of the United 
States. The town was freely accessible to the public and generally speaking there 
was nothing to distinguish it from other towns in the vicinity. Mrs March, a 
Jehovah's witness wanted to distribute religious literature but was warned that the 
company's regulations did not permit her to do so. She proceeded to do so and was 
arrested by the sheriff for committing the offence of remaining on private property 
after being warned by the owner not to be there. 
Mrs March contended _in Court that her arrest was an infringement of her right to 
freedom of religion. Justice Black found that if the title to Chickasaw had belonged 
to a municipal corporation her conviction would have had to be set aside as her 1st 
Amendment rights would have been infringed on the grounds that neither a state nor 
a municipality could completely bar the distribution of religious material. The judge 
64 Grace March v State of Alabama 326 US 501; 66 S Ct 276; 90 L ed 265 . 
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ruled that the more an owner, for his own advantage, opens up his property for use . 
by the public the more his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and 
constitutional rights of those who use it. The Court ruled that the company had · 
infringed Mrs March's constitutional r_ights and set her conviction aside. 65 
The following principle can be deduced from this case : 
Once a private person fulfils a traditional government function, that person will be 
bound by the bill of rights. The more a private person opens his business to the 
public the more likely it will be that his conduct is circumscribed by the constitution. 
5.2.4 JACKSON V METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY 66 
The Metropolitan Edison Company was a privately owned and operated company 
which delivered electricity to a service area which included the city of York in 
Pennsylvania, where the petitioner Catherine Jackson lived. To operate the 
company ·needed a certificate from the government, the Pennsylvania Public Utility 
Commission, and could only operate subject to extensive government regulations. 
On non-payment of Jackson's electricity account, her electricity was cut off, without 
notice to her. This, Jackson alleged, infringed her 14th Amendment due process 
rights to property. 
The majority decision of Justice Rehnquist, after referring to the Civil Rights cases, 
emphasised the difference between actions by the state which are subject to the 
14th Amendment and the actions of private persons which are not. Whether 
particular conduct is private or state action can be difficult to determine. The mere 
fact that private business is state-regulated .cannot by itself make the private acts of 
such a person the actions of the state. This is so even if the regulation is extensive. 
It might however be a factor, taken together with other factors, which would lead to 
the conclusion of sufficient state involvement. The true test is the following: 
65 
66 
March v Alabama 90 L ed at p 269. 
-Jackson v Metropolitan Edison Company 419 US 345; 95. S Ct 449; 42 Led 
2d 477 (1974). 
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"But the enquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus 
between the state and the challenged actions of the regulated entity so 
that the actions of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the state 
itself. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . The true nature of the state's involvement may not 
be immediately obvious and a detailed inquiry may be required in 
order to determine whether the test is met."67 
Mrs Jackson's first argument was that the termination without notice by the electrical 
company should be seen as state action because of the monopoly status of the 
company to supply electricity to the people. In rejecting this argument the Court 
found that there was an insufficient nexus between the cutting off of the electricity 
and the state permitting the monopoly, to render the cutting off of the electricity state 
action. 
Mrs Jackson next argued that state action was present because the company 
provided an essential public service. Justice Rehnquist rejected this argument by 
stating that state action will be present only if a private entity exercises a power 
traditionally and exclusively exercised by the state. In the history of Pennsylvania 
however the providing of electricity had never been the traditional exclusive function 
of the state. 
Justice Rehnquist then found that Metropolitan Edison was a privately owned 
corporation which does not lease its facilities from the state. It pays tax to the state. 
It is extensively regulated in a way that most other businesses are not. Metropolitan 
elected to terminate Jackson's service in a manner which the state found 
permissible. Despite this the judge concluded: 68 
67 
68 
" ............. this is not sufficient to connect the state of Pennsylvania with 
respondent's actions so as to make the latter's conduct attributable to 
the state for the purpose of the 14th Amendment." 
Jackson v Metropolitan 95 S Ct 440 at p 453. 
Jackson v Metropolitan 95 S Ct 440 at p 457. 
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Justice Douglas, who dissented, found that the issue could not be determined by 
. finding that a single factor or relationship presents a sufficient degree of state 
involvement. The question had to be determined by taking all-the facts into account, 
to see whether the aggregate compelled a finding of state responsibility. The most 
important· factor was that Metropolitan Edison was the only puplic utility which 
furnished electrical power to the city. If electricity is denied under modern 
conditions the home becomes uninhabitable. The state was further extensively 
involved in regulating the electrical company's operations. In fact the commission's 
functions were that of supervision and regulation and it had to be involved. The 
judge concluded that Metropolitan Edison was bound by the 14th Amendment69. 
Justice Marshall, also dissenting, pointed out that the Supreme Court had in the 
past relied on the following factors to find the presence of state action in the actions 
of private companies70. Firstly the electricity supplier was a state sanctioned · 
monopoly. This is a factor that weighs heavily with the Court. If by itself this factor 
was not enough there was also an extensive pattern of co-operation between the 
state and the private entity. On the facts Justice Marshall found far more state 
involvement than was found by the majority opinion. Finally Justice Marshall relied 
on the fact that Metropolitan Edison was providing an essential public service 








There is an area of private action where the constitution will not apply. .. , 
There must be sufficient nexus between the state and the offending actions 
so that the latter may be fairly treated as that of the state. 
95 S Ct 440 at p 459 Justice Douglas said :"In the aggregate, these factors depict a 
monopolist providing essential public services as a licensee of the state and within a 
framework of extensive state supervision and controls .......... Respondents' actions are 
sufficiently intertwined with those of the state and its termination of service provisions are 
sufficiently buttressed by state law to warrant a holding that respondents' action in 
terminating this householder's services was a state action." · 
Jackson v Metropolitan. 95 S Ct 440 at p 461. 
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(c) A detailed enquiry must be made into the true nature of the state's 
involvement. 
(d) The majority held that state action will be present if the private entity 
e~ercised a function tr~ditionally and exclusively exercised by the state. 
To record that the above. principles are not absolute and may develop further I am 
also stating the principles I deduced from the minority judgments. The minority held 
that state action will be present if the following has been established: 
( e) There is a state sanctioned monopoly held by the private entity. 
(f) There is an extensive pattern of co-operation between the state and the 
private entity. 
(g) A service is provided by the private entity that is uniquely public in nature. 
(h) Any one of these facts can weigh heavily enough to find state action. 
(i) The values of pluralism and diversity in a society should be taken into 
account. 
} 
\ ... _ 
5.2.5 FLAGG BROS INC V BROOKS71 
"· 
After Sherley Brooks and her family were evicted from their apartment in Mount 
Vernon, New York, the local Marshall arranged for Brooks's goods to be stored with 
Flagg Bros in its warehouse. A dispute arose over the amount of the storage 
charges. Brooks was warned by Flagg Bros stating that if she did not settle her 
account her goods would be sold. Brooks applied for an injunction prohibiting the 
71 Flagg Bros Inc v Brooks 436 US 149; 98 S Ct 1729; 56 Led 2d 185 (1978). 
See also Paul Brest State Action and Liberal Theory, A Case Note on Flagg 
Bros v Brook (1982) 130 University of Pennsylvania Law Reviewe 1296. 
/ 
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sale alleging that the said sale (in terms of the New York Uniform Commercial Code) 
would violate her due process and equal protection of property rights granted to her 
in terms of the 14th Amendment. She alleged she was deprived of her property 
without due process. The District Court dismissed her claim but the Court of 
Appeals found that: 
"By enacting Section 7 - 21 O the State of New York not only delegated 
to the warehouseman a portion of its sovereign monopoly power over 
binding conflict resolution, but also let him, by selling stored goods 
execute a lien and thus perform a function which has traditionally been 
that of the sheriff." 72 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Mr Justice Rehnquist, who delivered the majority 
opinion of the Court, remarked that it is important to keep in mind that most rights 
secured by the Constitution are protected only against infdngements by the 
government. The question to be answered therefore is whether the sale of the 
goods by the Flagg Bros can be attributed to the State of New York? 
Brooks firstly argued that the resolution of private disputes was a traditional function 
of civil government. This function the state had delegated to Flagg Bros by enacting 
Sections 7 - 21 O of the New York Uniform Commercial Code73 Referring to Smith v 
Allwright74 and the other cases decided on the issue of the right to vote Justice 
Rehn_~~ist found that Brooks read too much into those cases. The conduct of 
~ . 
election is and always was an exclusively public function as was the running of a 
~ . 
town. The test is whether the function is one exclusively performed by the state with 




Flagg Bros v Brooks 98 S Ct at p 1732. 
The Uniform Commercial Code provides inter alia that the warehouseman's 
lien may be enforced by himself at a public or private sale that he arranges. 
on certain reasonable terms and conditions. Section 5 is the really offending 
provision which provides that a purchaser of goods at such a sale acquires 
good title to the goods, i.e. ownership. 
See footnote 11 . 
/ 
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The Court found that the settlement of disputes between creditors and debtors was 
not traditionally and exclusively a public function75 The type of functions that· are 
exclusively performed by government are the running of elections, governing of _ 
cities, education, fire and police protection and tax collection. 
Th~ secon~ argument was that the action of Flagg Bros in sell.ing her property 
should be attributed to the state because the state had authorised and encouraged 
it by its enactment of Section 7 - 210. 
In dismissing this argument Justice Rehnquist found that a state is responsible for 
the act of a private party when the state by its laws has compelled the act. He 
stated: 
"This Court however has never held that a state's mere acquiescence 
in a private action converts that action into that of the state. "76 
The majority concluded that this was not a case where the State of New York had 
compelled the sale of goods. The Commercial Code merely announced the 
circumstances under which a prfvate person may sell the goods of another. On the 
facts the warehouseman was not subject to the restraint of the 14th Amendment. No 
violation of Brooks' rights by either the State of New York or Flagg Bros occurred. 77 
Justice~ Marshall, White and Stevens dissented. One cannot overlook the 
·-~-
frustrations of Mr Justice Marshall with the majority's application of the public 
. ... 




Flagg Bros v Brooks 98 S Ct at p 1736 the Court found " .... the settlement of 
disputes between debtors and creditors is not traditionally an exclusive public 
function .. .. .. . . Thus even if we were inclined to extend the sovereign function 
doctrine outside of its presently carefully confined bounds, the field of private 
commercial transaction would be a particularly inappropriate area into which 
to expand. 
Flagg Bros v Brooks 98 S Ct at p 1737. 
Flagg Bros v Brooks 98 S Ct at p 1738. 
/ 
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"I cannot remain silent., as the Court demonstrates, not for the first 
time, an attitude of callous indifference to the realities of life for the 
poor." 78 
He found that in New York the execution of a lien had been traditionally the function 
of the sheriff, The public function, test was therefore applicable. 
Justices Stevens and White found that a state statute which authorised a private 
party to deprive another person of his property without his consent must meet the 
requirements of the 14th Amendment. The majority's view, that the statute is not 
subject on the basis that the statute only permits it, but does not compel it, should 
be rejected. 
"Under this approach a state could enact laws authorising private 
citizens to self-help in countless situations without any possibility of 
federal challenge. A stafe statute could authorise the warehouseman 
to retain all proceeds of the lien sale, even if it far exceeded the 
amount of the debt; it could authorise finance companies to enter 
private homes to repossess merchandise; or indeed it could authorise 
"any person with sufficient physical power" ante, at 1734, to acquire 
and sell the property of his weaker neighbour."79 
Convin~ingly in my view the minority held that the distinction between permission 
~ . 
and compulsion is not relevant in determining whether state action is present. The 
K . . 
Supreme Court recognised that there are many levels of state involvement that 
could support a finding of state action. By enacting Section 7 - 21 O the state had 
given Flagg Bros the power to convey ownership of one person's goods to another. 
The non-consensual transfer of ownership of property had always been a traditional 
function of government. The majority opinion that the test is "exclusive" government 
function is wrong. The word "exclusive" should not be included in the test. 
78 
79 
Flagg Bros v Brooks 98 S Ct at p 1739,. 
Flagg Bros v Brooks 98 S Ct at p 17 40. 
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THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES CAN BE DEDUCED FROM THESE CASES : 
a. A private person will be subject to the constitution if he performs a function 
that has traditionally and exclusively been performed by government. 
b. If a statute compels a person to act, such action will be suqject to the 
constitution. 
c. There is uncertainty when a statute permits or encourages people to perform 
an act, whether such action will be state action. 
5.2.6 THE SHELLEY V KRAMER CASE80 
In the city of St Louis, 30 property owners in a neighbourhood signed an agreement 
which provided that: 
"the said property is hereby restricted to the use and occupancy for the 
term of 50 years from this date ....... against the occupancy as owners 
or tenants of any portion of the said property for resident or other 
purposes by people ofthe Negro or Mongolian race." 81 
During August 1945' Shelley, a Negro bought a property from one of the owners who 
had ~_igned the above-mentioned agreement. Later that year the respondents, as 
.... . 
owners of the other properties subject to the agreement, brought an action asking 
. ~ . 
that Shelley be restrained from taking possession of his new property. 
The Supreme Court of Missouri granted the relief and ruled that the agreement was 
valid as no state action was involved and that enforcement of the restraint violated 
no rights secured by the constitution. In the Supreme Court Shelley argued that the 
judicial enforcement of this agreement had violated his 14th Amendment rights not 
to be subjected to racial discrimination. 
80 
81 
, Shelley v Kramer 334 US 1; 68 S Ct 836; 92 Led 1161 (1948). 
Shelley v Kramer 68 S Ct at p 838. 
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The unanimous decision of the Court was delivered by Mr Chief Justice Vinson who 
ruled as follows: 
"The agreement does not seek to determine what the land . may be 
u~ed for, but rather the race of person who may or may not use the 
property. Among the civil rights intended to be protected by the 14th 
Amendment are the rights to acquire, enjoy, own and dispose of 
property. These rights all citizens must enjoy equally. Whenever the 
state had attempted by law to provide for provisions similar to those 
contained in the agreement the Supreme Court had struck it down. 
This case unlike those decided by the Court does not involve action by 
the state legislature or city councils. In this case the pattern of 
discrimination is brought about by an agreement amongst private 
individuals. The participation of the state consists in the enforcement 
of the agreement by the judicial system." 
Referring to the Civil Rights cases the Court stated that the basic principle of the 
14th Amendment is to only inhibit such action as may be fairly said to be that of the 
state. The agreement alone and voluntary adherence thereto by the signatories did 
not infringe Shelley's rights. But here there was more because the agreement had 
been enforced by the highest Court in, the state. The judge remarked that the 
Supreniie Court had always ruled that if the judiciary was the source of procedural 
\ .. .,:_ . 
unfairness which infringed constitutional rights, such infringement would constitute 
"· . 
state action}~ Therefore Judge Vinson concluded, if a state Court enforces the 
common law and such enforcement violates a constitutional right, the · violation is 
subject to the constitutional review. The judicial branch of government is not 
immune to the operation of constitutional rights. 
82 
83 
Shelley v Kramer 68 S Ct at p 841. 
Shelley v Kramer 6S S Ct at p 844. 
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The Court remarked that the historical context of how the rights came about should 
always be looked at. It should be asked what the framers sought to achieve, what 
their purpose was. The Court concluded that the framers intended to establish 
equality in the enjoyment of basic civil and political rights and- the preservation of 
those rights from discriminatory action by the state based on considerations of race 
or colour. 
THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES TO BE DEDUCED FROM SHELLEY: 
a. The acts of the judiciary are subject to the Constitution, as the judiciary is part 
of the state. 
b. If a judge commands a private person to take certain actions, that person so 
commanded or supported by the Court order shall be subject to the 
constitution .. 
c. If state legislation prescribes a certain activity or officially recognises the 
legitimacy thereof then state action will also be present. 84 It follows that if a 
state statute commands an action, for example requiring that restaurant 
owners in a state serve meals on a segregated basis, the actions of the 
restaurant in that state will be state action for constitutional purposes. 
5.2.7 ijURTON V WILMINGTON PARKING AUTHORITY 85 
-~i-. 
A private restaurant owner who refused to serve Negroes leased his premises from 
a state created parking authority. The building on which the premises were situated 
had been demarcated for public use. The cost of the land and maintenance of the 
building were derived by the City of Wilmington from public money. Guests at the 
restaurant were allowed to park their cars in the government garage which had 
84 
85 
See Rotunda, Nowak and Young section 16.3. 
Burton V Wilmington Parking Authority ,365 US 715; 81 S Ct 856; 6 L ed 2d 
45 (1961 ). 
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benefited because of the presence of a restaurant. The Court found that the state 
had: 
" ........ so far insinuated itself in· a position of interdependence with 
Eagle (the restaurant owner) that it must be recognised as a joint 
participant in the challenged activity, which on that accoun_t cannot be 
considered to have been so "pure private" as to fall without the scope 
of the 14th Amendment. 1186 
5.2.8 LEBRON V NATIONAL RAILWAY PASSENGER CORPORATION 87 
In 1992 Lebron contracted with the leasing agents of the National Railway 
Passengers Corporation (AMTRAK) for the rights to place advertisements on an 
AMTRAK billboard in New York. The space rented was known as "the Spectacular", 
a covered illuminated billboard of massive proportions. After the signing of the 
agreement Lebron proposed putting up an advertisement which criticised the Coors 
empire (Coors is a well-known beer) for its support of right wing causes and 
specificaily its support of the contras in Nicaragua. AMTRAK's vice president, 
relying on a clause in the contract, turn down the advertisement . Lebron filed suit 
against AMTRAK claiming that the refusal violated his First and Ninth Amendment 
rights. 
AMTRAK, a corporation, was created by the Rail Passenger Services Act to further 
-~~ . . 
a congressional finding that the public needed a good transport service. Six of ... 
AMTRAK's 01ght directors are appointed directly by the president, of whom four are 
submitted to the President on the consent and advice of the Senate. However, a 
provision in the Rail Passenger Services Act stated that AMTRAK would not be an 
agency or establishment of the United States government. 
86 
87 
Burton v Wilmington 81 S Ct at p 861. 




The District Court found that because of its close ties to government, AMTRAK was 
• a government actor for constitutional purposes and that Lebron's right to freedom of 
speech had been abridged. It ordered AMTRAK to display the sign. The United 
States Court of Appeals88 reversed this decision. Lebron appealed to the Supreme 
Court. 
Justice Scalia, in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court found that a 
corporation is a part of the government for the purposes of the 1st Amendment if the 
government: 89 
a. created the corporation by special law for the furtherance of government 
objectives; and 
b. retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of the corporation's 
directors. 
5.3 ACADEMIC OPINION 
The impact of Judge Bradley's judgment in the Civil Rights cases in October 1883 




" ...... there are no generally accepted formulae for determining when a 
sufficient amount of government action is present in a practice, thus 
justifying subjecting the practice to constitutional restraint ................. . 
"'::fhe lack of predictability stems from the Court's repeated insistence 
that state action depends in each case on sifting the facts and 
weighing the circumstances." 90 
12 F 3d 388 (1993). 
Lebron v National at p 922. 
Rotunda et al Section 16.!;i at p 194. 
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Professor Lewis criticises the state action concept for not having , any general · 
principles to mark its limits. 91 Glennon and Nowak92 remark that the state action 
doctrine has no general accepted formula for determining when there is sufficient 
state involvement to attract constitutional scrutiny. 
Huston remarks that state action in a sense permeates_ the whole of society: for the 
existence of any thing and the action of any individual or group is permitted, -
commanded or forbidden by the state . 93 
Prof Brest in his discussion of the Flagg Bros case remarks that the Courts' State 
Action Doctrine seems a crude substitute for addressing and accommodating the 
concerns to prevent abuse of power on the one hand, and to protect individual 
autonomy and federalist values on the other 94. 
It does seem that in the long run the academic criticisms have made some impact. 
Mr Justice Scalia recognised the need for a coherent theory as to when private 
actions may be deemed to be that of the state, for constitutional purposes. He 






"It is fair to say that our cases deciding when private action might be 
deemed that of the state have not been a model of consistency." 95 
Thomas P Lewis The_ Meaning of State Action (1960) 60 Columbia Law 
Review 1083 at p 1121. 
Robert J Glennon and John E Nowak A Functional Analysis of the 
Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement (1976) The Supreme 
Court Review 221 at p 221-224. 
Jo.hn A Huston Constitutional Law - State Court Enforcement of Race 
Restrictive Covenants as State Action within scope of Fourteenth Amendment. 
(1947) 45 Michigan Law Review 733 at p 747. 
Brest at p 1330. 
Lebron v National at p 909. 
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5.4 CONCLUSION 
From the discussion of the foregoing cases and the principles deduced from each 
case, the following concluding principles can be formulated with respect to the 
scope of the application of the American Bill of Rights. 
a. The Bill of Rights has primarily a vertical only application. 96 
b. Rights will be applied horizontally in exceptional circumstances. 
c. The judiciary is part of the state and the Bill of Rights applies to it. 
d. If a private person performs a function traditionally and exclusively performed 
by government, such as administering the electoral system or a town, it will 
be bound by the constitution. 
e. If a private person is commanded or encouraged by state legislation or state 





If a private person is sufficiently entangled with government his actions will 
be subject to the constitution. 
~. 
\ ..•. 
The funding by the state of private persons whose actions breach the 
"· 
constitution is a breach by the state of its constitutional obligations to its 
citizens. However, whether an individual who receives state funding is 
subject to the constitution, in the absence of other forms of state 
engagement, has not been settled. 
h. A corporation will be subject to constitutional restraint if it is created by 
special law for the furtherance of government objectives and if government 
96 Greenya v George Washington University 512 Federal Reporter 2nd Series· 
556 at p 559 
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retained for itself the permanent authority to appoint 'a majority of the 
corporation's directors. 
Are the above principles suitable for applying to the South African Bill of Rights? I 
suggest they are not for the following reasons : 
1. The Preamble and Declaration in the South African Constitution demand that 
the essential rights should have direct horizontal application. 
2 The historical context of the origins of the two Bills of Rights is significantly 
different. 
3. In the South African Constitution whether a right applies in a given factual 
situation depends on the wording of the right itself read with section 33 (the 
limitation clause). The rights in the American Bill of Rights on the other hand 
are not evaluated in a two stage approach. 
4. The preferred method in determining the scope-of a right is not by enquiring 
whether the State is involved but by actually evaluating the values underlying 
the competing rights 
5. The Values Test implies that there will be some rights that will only have 
)'ertical application. The American principles in the light of years of 
~ . 
experience should be looked at for guidance when applying fundamental 
" 
rights-between the state and private person. 
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CANADA 
5.5 THE CANADIAN CHARTER 
In 1982 the Federal Parliament of Canada adopted the Constitution Act, 1982.97 Part 
1 of the Act co'nsists of _a Bill of Rights named the "Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms". The application clause, clause 32(1 ), is very similar to section 7(1) of 
the Interim Constitution. The Canadian Charter also has a limitation clause set out 
in clause 1. What is immediately evident is that the Canadian Charter is a lot more 
similar in structure to the South African Bill of Rights than is the American Bill of 
Rights. In this chapter I will investigate the manner in which the Canadian Supreme 
Court has resolved the application of its Charter 
The rights in the Charter are phrased in a similar manner to the South African Bill of 
Rights. For example,Section 12 states: 
. "Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual 
treatment or punishment." 
Section 32(1) which deals with the application of the Charter provides that: 
97 
"This charter applies; 
(a) 
~ .. : 
to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all 
matters within the authority of Parliament including all matters 
relating to the Yukon Territory and Northwest Territories; and 
Peter W Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada 3ed (1992) 7. 
/ 
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(b) · to the legislature and government of each province in respect of 
all matters within the authority of the legislature of each 
province. "98 
5.6 THE DECISIONS OF THE CANADIAN COURTS. 
5.6.1. RETAIL, WHOLESALE AND DEPARTMENT STORE UNION, LOCAL 
580 ET AL V DOLPHIN DELIVERY LTD, ET AL99 
This matter was the first Canadian case which canvassed the application issue. The 
core facts were that Dolphin Delivery Ltd (hereinafter referred to as "Dolphin") 
conducted courier business in Canada and it had dealings with Purolator Courier 
Incorporated (hereinafter referred to as "Purolator"). Purolator's employees 
belonged to the Appellant Union which was their bargaining agent. Dolphin was a 
party to a collective agreement with another union (not Appellant) which provided 
that.Dolphin's employees would be protected from dismissal if they refused to cross 
a picket line. As a result of a labour dispute between Purolator and the Appellant 
union,· the Appellant unlon decided to picket Dolphin's premises. It informed Dolphin 
that unless it stopped doing business with Purolator, its premises would be picketed. 
Obviously concerned in the light of its employees' right to refuse to cross a picket 
line, Dolphin obtained an urgent interdict against the Appellant union and its 
members prohibiting them from picketing. On appeal to the Supreme Court the 
union argued that the interdict infringed its freedom of expression. 
'·a,.. 
Section 2 of the Canadian Bill of Rights states: 
98 
99 
"Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: 
(a) 
Dale Gibson The Charter of Rights and the Private Sector (1982-83) 12 The 
Manitoba Law Journal 213. Prof Gibson holds the view that the charter also 
applies to private relations. 
Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 580 et al v Dolphin 
Delivery Ltd, et al (1986) 25 CRR 321, 33 DLR 4th p 174. 
/ 
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(b) freedom of thought, belief,· opi,nion and expression, 
including freedom of the press and other media of 
communication;" 
Justice McIntyre had to decide whether, in the light of Section 32 of the Charter, 
Section 2 applied to private litigation. He remarked that section .32 specified the 
actors to whom the charter applies. 100 They are the legislative, executive and 
administrative branches of government. The court found that a judge when issuing 
an order is not part of the state. The Court therefore concluded that the Court 
interdict did not infringe the union and its members' freedom of expression. 
The consequences of this very legalistic interpretation and narrow view on this issue 
of the application of the charter have been heavily criticised. 101 Dale Gibson 
remarked that as the government privatises its functions the ambit of the charter will 
shrink.: 
"Oppressive conduct is no less hurtful, after all when it comes from Big 
(or little) Business than when it comes from Big Government."102 
The same sentiments are echoed by Prof F R Scott. 103 Prof Gibson also pointed 
out the problems relating to the, narrow interpretation in the Dolphin case. He noted 
that if the Charter only applies to government then government employees have all 
the rigt.lts embodied in the Bill of Rights, whilst private employees have none. 
'-;...• 
Patients of public hospitals will have Charter protection but private patients none. 104 · 
. It.. 






Dolphin Delivery 33 DLR 4th p 195. 
David Beatty_ Constitutional Conceits: The Coersive Authority of the Courts. 
(1987) 37 University of Toronto Law Journal 183 concludes at p.192 that "In 
the circumstances, the Supreme Court has no option but to overrule its 
decision in Dolphin Delivery." 
Dale Gibson The Deferential Trojan Horse : Decade of Charter Decisions 
(1993) 72 The Canadian Bar Review No 4 p 417 at p.426. 
F R Scott Canadian Federalism: The Legal Perspective. (1966 -67) 5 Alta LR 
262 at 265. 
Dale Gibson The Charter of Rights and the Private Sector ( 1982 - 8,3) 12 
The Manitoba Law Journal 213 at p 21 ~-
/ 
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Dolphin case. Apart from suggesting that the Court had misquoted the authorities for 
its finding that the Charter does· not apply to private litigation 1°5, he also points out 
the following: 
"The real irony of the Dolphin Delivery decision on Charter application 
is that, while the labour relation policy choices of, legislatures and 
expert administrative tribunals will be subject to review, for consistency 
with the Charter, and hence provide the opportunity for renewed, 
judicial entanglement and intervention in legislative policy-making, the 
labour policy choices of the judiciary in shaping and applying common 
law doctrines, already severely criticised for being inbred with liberal 
economic values and assumptions that are antithetical to collective 
worker activity and interests, will go unreviewed for consistency with 
Charter values." 106 
Probably the most incisive criticism is that of Hutchinson and Peter: 
' ... 
"The Charter forces us to cram the rich complexity of social life into an 
abstract and simplistic framework. Distinctions like those developed in 
Dolphin provide formal paraphernalia behind which private power 
,· 
thrives relatively· unchecked and substantive issues are arbitrarily and 
unjustly resolved." 107 
The champions of indirect horizontal application argue that the principles as 
"· 





Brian Etherington Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 580 
v Dolphin Delivery Ltd (1987) 66 The Canadian Bar Review 819 at p 832. 
Etherington at p 836. See also David Beatty Constitutional Conceits : The 
Coercive Authority of the Courts (1987) 37 University of Toronto Law Journal 
183 at p 186: 
For an overview of all the arguments for and against the horizontal 
application of the Charter consult Brian Slattery Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms - Does it Bind Private Persons (1985) 63 Canadian Bar Review 
548 Footnote 3." 
Allan C Hutchinson and Andrew Peter Private Rights/Public Wrongs; The 
Liberal Lie of the Charter 38 University of Toronto Law Jourr:,al p 297. 
/ 
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Bill of Rights and that Dolphin Delivery shquld be followed here. My view is that this 
section states only that the court must have due regard to the spirit , purport and 
objects of the Constitution. "Due regard" can mean many things. If Dolphin is 
followed the very real possibility exists that adjustments to the common law will be 
negligible in so far as the broader aims of the Interim Constitution are concerned 108. 
5.6.2 SLAIGHT COMMUNICATIONS V DAVIDSON 109 
Mr Ron Davidson, a radio time salesman employed by Slaight Communications Inc 
operating as Q107 FM radio, was dismissed after three and a half years of service, 
ostensibly because his performance was inadequate. Mr Davidson filed a complaint 
under the Canadian Labour Code. The parties were unable to resolve the matter 
and an adjudicator was appointed in terms of the Labour Code. 
The adjudicator, Mr Joffe, found that Mr Davidson was unjustly dismissed as his 
service was more than satisfactory. In fact on most occasions Mr Davidson had 
made more than his target sales so the true reason for his dismissal could not have · 
been bad performance. When Mr Joffe invited Slaight Commu-nications to disclose 
the true reasons for the dismissal, Slaight Communications refused. lhe adjudicator 
ordered a money payment of $46 628-96 and that the employer give the 





"that any communication to Q107, its management" or staff, whether . 
-.received by letter, telephone or otherwise from any person or company 
u . 
about Mr Ron Davidson's employment at Q107, shall be answered 
Stuart Woolman Defamation, Application and the Interim Constitution; An 
Unqualified and Direct Analysis of Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd. at 
page 437 where he points out the very real danger of this approach. He 
states: " .... the provision (35(3)) will be read as providing no more that a bit of 
textual incentive for making minor interstitial . developments in existing 
common-law doctrines." 
Slaight Communications Inc v Davidson 59 DLR (4th) p 416. 
Slaight Communications Inc v Davidson at p 4~0. 
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exclusively by sending or delivering a copy of the said letter of 
recommendation". 
The employer appealed and when the matter ended in the Supreme Court one of 
the issues raised was that this order infringed the employer's right of freedom of 
speech under the Canadian Charter. On this po.int the unanimous vi~w of the Court 
was written by Justice Lamer who found as follows: 111 
"The fact that the Charter applies to the order made by the adjudicator 
in the case at bar is not, in my opinion, open to question. The 
adjudicator is a statutory creature: he is appointed pursuant to a 
legislative provision and derives all his powers from the statute: As 
the Constitution is the supreme law of Canada and any law that is 
inconsistent with its provisions is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of 
no force or effect, .it is impossi~le to interpret legislation conferring 
discretion as conferring a power to infringe the Charter, unless, of 
course, that power is expressly conferred or necessarily implied. "112 
I agree with the finding of the court. In my view the state should never be able to 
escape the constraints of a bill of rights by delegating its functions to others. 
111 
112 
Slaight Communications Inc v Davidson at p 444. 
The Judge then quotes the following by Professor Hogg in his text entitled Constitutional 
Law of Canada, 2d ed (Toronto), The Carswell Company Limited, 1985), at p 671: "The 
reference in s. 32 to the "Parliament" and a "legislature" make clear that the charter operates 
as a limitation on the powers of those legislative bodies. Any statute enacted by either 
Parliament or a Legislature which is inconsistent with the Charter will be outside the power of 
(ultra vires) the enacting body and will be invalid. It follows that any body exercising · 
statutory authority, for example, the Governor in Council or Lieutenant Governor in Council, 
ministers, officials, municipalities, school boards, universities, administrative tribunals and 
police officers, is also bound by the Charter. Action taken under statutory authority is valid 
only if it is within the scope of that authority. Since neither Parliament nor a Legislature can 
itself pass a law in breach of the Charter, neither body can authorise action which would be in 
breach of the Charter. Thus, the limitations on statutory authority which are imposed by the 
Charter will flow down the chain of statutory authority and apply to regulations, by-laws, 
orders, decisions and all other action (whether legislative, administrative or judicial) which· 
depends for its validity on statutory authority." · 
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5.6.3 McKINNEY V UNIVERSITY OF GUELPH 
The majority of the Supreme Court in McKinney v University of Guelph113 followed 
the view expressed by Justice McIntyre in the Dolphin case. The judgement was 
delivered by Justice La Forest with whom Justice Dickson and Justice Gonthier 
concurred. The background Jacts were the following: 
The Universities of Guelph, Toronto, York and Laurentian all had established 
retirement policies for their staff. At the University of Toronto its staff had to retire at 
65. This was effected by a formal resolution of its board and the University Pension 
Fund. At York University both the university plan and the collective agreement with 
the faculty association provided for retirement at age 65. At the University of 
Guelph, mandatory retirement was basedon policy and practice and a pension plan 
that provided for retirement at age 65. At Laurentian University, retirement policy of 
65 was established by the general by-laws, the collective agreement between the 
university and the faculty, and the retirement plan for the staff. 
Eight faculty members and a professional librarian employed by the above-
mentioned Universities alleged in the Supreme Court that their equality rights in _ 
terms of Section 15 of the Charter had been infringed in that they were being 
discriminated against on the basis of their age. 
Sectii;)rt 15(1) states: 
~~-
~:"Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to 
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination 
II 
La Forest ruled that the universities were not bound by the charter. He pointed out 
that Section 32 gives a strong message that the Charter is _confined to government 
action and that the exclusion of private activity from the Charter was not a result of 
113 McKinney v University of Guelph (,1990), 2 CRR (2d) 1, 76 DLR (4th) 545. 
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happenstance. Several reasons 114 are advanced by La Forest for applying the 
Gharter in the above fashion. 
a.. Historically, bills of rights had been directed against governments, for 
example, the United States Constitution. 
b. To open up all private and public action to judicial review-could strangle the 
operation of society and diminish the area of freedom within which individuals 
can act. 
c. The horizontal application of the Charter will impose an impossible burden on 
the Courts. 
d. Government may establish specialised tribunals like Human Rights 
Commissions to deal more effectively with discriminatory practices. 
e. Dolphin Delivery had already settled the issue. 
La Forest found that although universities are subject to government regulatfon and 
largely depend on government funds, they manage their own affairs and allocate 
those funds as they wish. ·Statutes incorporating universities do not alter ttie 
traditional nature of the institution as a community of scholars and students enjoying 
substa~tial autonomy. For Charter purposes, therefore, universities do not form part 
\-~-
of government. .... 
Justice Sopinka concurred 115 stating that while some of the universities' functions 




McKinney v University of Guelph 76 DLR (4th) at p 634. 
McKinney v University of Guelph 76 DLR (4th) at p 697. 
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Justice Wilson dissented and found that the state exercised a substantial measure 
of control over universities in the area of funding, go_verning structure and policy. 116 
For the purpose of Section 32 of the Charter the relevant universities were 
government and the Charter applied to them. 
In coming to "the above conclusion the judge developed a. principled and 
comprehensive test for determining whether entities not obviously part of 
government should be viewed as government for Charter purposes. Justice Cory 
also subscribed to Justice Wilson's test .117 
Justice Wilson stated the test as follows: 118 
"As a result, I would favour an approach that asks the following questions 
about entities that are not self-evidently part of legislative, executive or 
administrative branches of government: 
1. Does the legislative, executive or administrative branch of government 
exercise control over the entity in question? 
2. Does the entity perform a traditional government function or a function 
which in more modern times is recognised as a responsibility of the 
state? 
.~· .... 
3. Is the entity one that acts pursuant to statutory authority specifically ... 
".wanted to it to enable it to further an objective that government seeks 
to promote in the broader public interest?" 
In this thesis I will refer to the above test as the Guelph Test 119 I support this test 





McKinney v University of Guelph 76 DLR (4th) at p 593 f. 
McKinney v University of Guelph 76 DLR (4th) at p 592 f. 
McKinney v University of Guelph 76 DLR (4th) at p 698 H to 699 B. 
This test is set out in greater detail in clause 5.8 below: 
_,/ 
-62 
1. It is a comprehensive and principled theory scrutinising state involvement. 
2. It takes into account the many manifestations in which the state operates in a. 
modern society. 
3. It will ensure that the state cannot hide behind complex legal structures. 
5.6.4 VANCOUVER GENERAL HOSPITAL V STOFFMAN 120 
Justice Wilson developed the Guelph test further in her minority judgment in the 
Vancouver General Hospital case. 121 
The background facts were that the Vancouver General Hospital Act empowered a 
board of trustees to manage the hospital and for those purposes pass by-laws. The 
board consisted of• 16 persons of whom 14 were appointed by government. The 
other two were selected by the hospital. The by-laws which the board of trustees 
had passed had to be approved by the Minister of Health Services before they could 
be of any force. Such a by-law was passed by the board th'at forced doctors to retire 
at the age of 65. The physicians at the hospital alleged this infringed their Section 
15 Charter rights as they were discriminated against on the basis of their age. 
As in Guelph, the majority, on the finding of government action, were La Forest J, 
~ ' 
Dickson C J C, Gonthier J and Sopinka J who held the hospital was not 
" 
"governmentJ'for Charter purposes. 
Wilson J, L' Heure·ux-Dube J, and Cory J held the hospital to be government for 
Charter purposes. As stated previously, Justice Wilson's Guelph test was further 
developed and applied in this case. The detail of the further developments is set 
out in clause 5. 7 below. 
120 
121 
Vancouver General Hospital et al v Stoffman et al 76 DLR 4th p 700. 




5.6.5 LAVIGNE V ONTARIO PUBLIC SERVICES EMPLOYEE UNION 
Finally, in Lavigne V Ontario Public Services Employee Union 122 Justice Wilson · 
' . 
again applied the · Guelph Test to determine whether a collective agreement is 
subject to the Charter. In using this test Justice Wilson said: 123 
"I fully appreciate that in McKinney and the appeals which were heard 
along with it only two of my colleagues endorsed my test for 
determining whether or not a body is a government actor for purposes 
of s. 32(1) of the Charter. On the other hand, I am unable to find a 
different test of general application enunciated in the reasons of the 
majority. Those reasons appear to me to reflect an ad hoc approach 
to the status of each entity brought before the court in order to 
.determine whether or not it forms part of the apparatus of Qovernment' 
so as to be subject to Charter review. This being so, I do not feel as 
constrained by precedent as I otherwise might. Indeed, I am 
unchastened in the view that this court has a duty to take a structured 
approach to this issue and establish appropriate criteria if at all 
possible for distinguishing those bodies which are subject to Charter 
constraint from those which are not. In any event, whether I am right 
or wrong on this, I believe that the ad hoc approach would yield the 
same result in this particular case." 
5.6.6 CONCLUSION. 
From the discussion of the above cases it is clear that the Guelph Test developed 
by Justice Wilson is the only comprehensive test for determining on a principled 
basis the scope of application of a bill of rights. For this reason I believe is should 
be applied in South Africa. I will now set out the Guelph Test in greater detail. 
122 
123 
Lavigne v Ontaria Public Service Employees Union 81 DLR 4th 545. 
Lavigne v Ontaria Public Service Employees Union at p 564, c - f. 
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5. 7 THE GUELPH TEST 
This test asks three questions, each of which can be viewed as a separate test. The 
tests can be stated as follows: (The formulations below, although not quoted 
verbatim from the,judgment of Justice Wilson, are her formulations). 
5.7.1 THE GUELPH CONTROL TEST 
The control test has two fields of focus: 
5.7.1.1 
5.7.1.2 
General questions about the nature and the extent of 
government control over an entity. 
Specific questions about the entity's activity such as "Is there a 
clear nexus between government and the particular impugned 
activity.". 
NATURE AND EXTENT OF CONTROL 
5.7.1.3 
5.7.1.4 
The purpose of these questions is to find out whether there is a 
link between that which we know is government and that which 
we are not sure is government, by focusing on whether the 
former exercises control of the latter. 
The inquiry focuses on what are relevant forms of control. There 
is no exhaustive list of what are relevant factors. -
The following can be examined to determine relevant forms of control: 






through input into the entity's policy formulation process, 
through the approval of by-laws or rules that determine how the 
entity is to carry out its mandate; or 
through the allocation of funding us~d to implement the entity's 
objectives; or 
through the appointment of personnel that run the entity. 
5.7.2 THE GUELPH GOVERNMENT FUNCTION TEST 









This test asks whether the performance of a given activity is a 
government function. 
Government is not just the maker and enforcer of laws. · 
Over time government has become involved in many areas 
through the creation of bodies that do not simply enact laws but 
that provide a wide range of services and support to citizens . 
Government's functions are not finite. It has become involved in 
an ever-widening range of activities. 
Government's functions are constantly evolving, moving into 
new areas and out of old ones. 
It is a mistake to try and determine the key functions that a 





A function becomes governmental because a government has 
decided that it should perform that function. 
A governmental and non-governmental body can fulfil a function 
at the same time. 
5.7.3 THE GUELPH GOVERNMENT ENTITY TEST 
This approach looks at the nature of a body's statutory authority and scrutinises the 
possibility that government has delegated its power to a subordinate body. 
This test asks the following question: 
5.7.3.1 
5.7.3.2 
Whether an entity performs a task pursuant to statutory 
authority; 
Whether it performs that task on behalf of government in 
furtherance of a government purpose. 
5. 7.4. PRINCIPLES EXTRACTED 
I have set out above and argued that the principles developed by Justice Wilson 
should;pe applied in South Africa. I have also extracted from American case law the 
·;... . 
principles developed by the American court. Before I can finally conclude that 
~ . . . 
Guelph Test is the preferred test is should be compared with the. American 
principles. This I will do in the following clause. 
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5.8 A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE AMERICAN PRINCIPLES AND THE 
GUELPH TEST 
In this paragraph I will compare the American prfnciples124 with the principles of the 
Guelph Test125. I will not discuss the principles developed by the majority 
judgements of the Canadian Supreme Court for the following reasons: , 
A Their approach is legalistic and it does n.ot take adequate account of 
the many manifestations of the state in a modern society. Provisions 
similar to our Preamble, Declaration and Schedule 4 are absent in the 
Canadian Constitution. Their judgements can therefore never give 
expression to the purpose envisaged by the drafters of our Preamble, 
Declaration and Schedule 4. The purpose that these sections express 
is of a changed society not just of changed organs of the stat~ in the 
strict sense of the word, 
8. The Guelph Test in any event contains all the principles of the 
Canadian majority on this issue. 
Both the State Action Principles and the Guelph Test prescribe that a bill of rights 
should have primarily a vertical application. 
In te~rri's of the State Action Principles the judiciary is subject to the bill of rights, 
' -~, 
whilst in._the Guelph Test it is not. This elevation of the judiciary above the confines 
of the bill of r(ghts was first pronounced by the majority judgements in Canada and is 
still also the majority view. In my view once the principle is decided that the bill of 
rights should only bind the state the judiciary should be excluded so as not in effect 
to subject private disputes to constitutional scrutiny by subjecting court orders to the 
bill of rights. 
124 
125 
The American Principles are set out in paragraph 5.4 above. 
The principles of the Guelph T~st is set out in paragraph 5. 7 above. , 
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5.8.1 THE GUELPH GOVERNMENT FUNCTION TEST 
The State Action Principles developed by the majority in the Texas Primary Cases 
as well as the March Case postulate that an actor who is not obviously part of the 
state will be subject to the constitution if he performs a function that has traditionally 
and exclusively been performed by government. 
The Guelph Government Function Test incorporates all the State Action Principles 
and holds that an entity that performs a traditional government function will be 
bound by the constitution irrespective whether it is exclusive or not. The Guelph 
Test however goes further and states that actors who perform a function which, in 
more modern times, is recognised as the "responsibility" of the state, will be subject 
to Charter restrictions if and when they perform those functions . 
. The Guelph Test is to be preferred as its principles provide for the changing nature 
and purpose of governmenf over time. A practical illustration is the RDP program in 
· south Africa. Governments obviously cannot be equated with a Newtonian universe 
with its planets and bodies forever circling along the same paths. History teaches 
the organic nature of government and how the course of history can send 
governments on unpredictable paths. In South Africa the state will be involved in 
extensive social engineering.· ·· We should not allow the state in these efforts to 
contract out of its constitutional constraints. For these reasons I prefer this leg of 
the ~uiS!lph Test over the State Action Principles . ... 
5.8.2 THE GUELPH CONTROL TEST 
The Guelph Control Test examines the nature of the relationship between that which 
is clearly part of the state and that which is not, to see if the former controls the 
latter. Similar state action principles were developed in the Burton and other cases. 
On the issue of control, no detailed test has been developed by the American 
Courts. The State Action Principles still speak of whether the private person is 
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"sufficie~tly entangled" or whether the private person can "fairly" be treated to be 
part of the state. 126 In contrast, the Guelph Control Test is a more principled test. It. 
investigates in a more realistic manner the ways .in which government can exercise. 
its power . It does so by examining whether government exercises control over the 
private entity in three areas: 
(a) The governing bodies of the private entity; 
(b) The policy formulation of the private entity; 
(c) Funding of the private entity. 
The control of these three areas is vital to how an entity can and will use its power. 
By putting these areas under the looking-glass the true nature of government 
involvement will become apparent. The added advantage of such a detailed test is 
that it can be used as a working legal tool to predict with some degree of accuracy 
whether the courts will hold that an entity is bound by the bill of rights. Therefore 
the Guelph Test in this area is to be preferred to the State Action Principles. 
5.8.3 THE GUELPH GOVERNMENT ENTITY TEST 
The Guelph Government Entity Test, which was formulated in 1990 by Justice 




Is the~entity one that acts pursuant to ~tatutory authority specifically granted 
., -
to enable it to further objectives that government seeks to promote in the 
broader public• interest? . 
Judge Friendly remarked that under the state action doctrine lawyers .... " 
must navigate with the aid of the wavering beacon furnished by Justice 
Clark's statement in Burton v Wilmington Parking Authority;" Only by sifting 
facts and weighing circumstances can the non obvious involvement of the 
State in private conduct be attributed its true significance." Judge Henry J 
Friendly The Public-Private Penumbra: Fourteen Years Later (1982) 130 
University of, Pennsylvania Law Review 1289 at p 1291. 
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Five years later and in the AMTRAK case, the United States Supreme Court for the 
_ first time laid down a similar test, as part of the State Action Principles. The State 
Action Principles are the following: 
A corporation will be subject to constitutional restraint: 
a. If it was created by special law; 
b. For the furtherance of government objectives; 
c. Government retained for itself the permanent authority to appoint a 
majority of the corporation's directors. 
Both tests state that the e.ntities must b_e created to fulfil government objectives., The 
State Action Principles however only _apply in respect of a corporation while the 
· Guelph Test is applicable to any entity. The Guelph Test will therefore cast a m·uch 
wider net. In principle there can surely be no reason why only corporations· should 
be bound. 
-In the Guelph Test the entity needs merely to act pursuant to statutory authority 
whilst the State Action Principles state that the corporation must be created by a 
specia(\law. ·~ ... 
The State Astion Principles further require that the state must have the exclusive 
rights to appoint the directors of the company before it can be said that the State is 
sufficiently involved. 
The rationale for the Guelph Government Entity Test is to prevent government from 
avoiding its constitutional obligations by delegating its programmes and functions to 
self-created legal entities. In the light of the social engineering that is taking place in · 
. South Africa, and that will still take place as inter alia evidenced by the RDP white 
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paper, the Guelph Government Entity Test, with its more general principles must be 
the preferred . test The narrowness of application of t~e State Action Principles 
stated in AMTRAK becomes. highlighted if one focuses on phrases used in the test 
like "corporation" and "special law", "permanent authority to appoint the majority of 
corporations' directors". These words make the State Action Principles . an 
. unworkable tool in the South African context. I believe that in the future the state will 
be involved in social engineering on a big scale to address the imbalances of the 
future. The vehides they will use to achieve their goals will be funded and controlled 
in manners much more subtle than the State Action principles can cater for. The 
Guelph Test should be applied here. 
5.8.4 CONCLUSION. 
From the above comparison it is clear that Guelph Test is to be preferred over the 
American' principles. 
5.9 THE GUELPH VALUES TEST 
As stated above the Guelph Test is the preferred test. Its shortcoming however is 
. that in the South African contexUt does not give expression to aims of the new order 
envisaged in the Preamble, Declaration and Schedule 4 of our Constitution. This 




_ A combination of the two I believe will give expression to the interactive purpose of 
all the constitutional provisions impacting on the applic~tion issue. 
The Guelph Values Test can be formulated as follows. To determine whether an 
act complained of infringes a right set out in chapter 3 the following inquiry should 
be conducted. Firstly it should be determined whether the state infringed the right. If 




1. Does the legislative, executive or administrative branch of government . 
exercise control over the entity that performed the act? 
2. Does the entity perform a traditional government function or a function 
. which. in more modern times is recognised as a responsibility of the 
state? 
3. Is the entity one that acts pursuant to statutory authority specifically 
granted to it to enable it to further an objective that government seeks 
to promote in the broader public interest?" 
Secondly and once it is determined that th_e state is not involved, the following 
enquiry should be conducted to determine whether the right should not be applied 
in a direct horizontal manner. 
(a) The values which the Constitution and more specifically the Bill 
of Rights, Preamble and Declaration desire for the new order 
should be identified. 
(b) It should then be determined whether those values were absent 
in the old order. If they were absent then the· values are ones 
that can transform our society. 
~(c) Next it should be determined whether the right in question can 
promote these values in the factual context of the case. 
( d) If the right can promote these values then it becomes an right 
essential for transformation and for the society envisaged by the 
Constitution and should be applied in a direct horizontal 
manner. 
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(f) The application of these essential rights should be limited by 
the values that other- rights promote, as well as the limitation 
clause, section 33. 
(e) The rights not promoting essential values should have vertical 
and indirect horizontal application only. 
In the next chapter I will examine the decisions of the South African courts to see if 




THE DECISIONS OF THE COURTS 
In this chapter I will examine the decisions of the South African Courts to see if any 
support can be found for the Guelph Values Test. 
6.1. MANDELA v FALATI 127 
The applicant at the time was a Deputy Minister. In 1992 she and the respondent 
were convicted of assault and kidnapping and sentenced to 6 years imprisonment. 
On appeal, the Appellate Division reduced the sentence of the applicant to R30,000 
and that of the respondent to 2 years imprisonment. After her release from prison 
the respondent wanted to disclose at a press conference the Applicant's role in 
certain atrocities. The applicant obtained an interim interdict prohibiting the 
respondent from conducting the press conference. On the return date an application 
was made for the extension of the interim interdict. The respondent argued that her 
right to freedom of expression allows her to conduct the press conference and on 
that basis the interim order should not be extendea. 
' 
The cburt ruled that it must first be determined whether; the Interim Constitution 
~ . 
applies to prjvate disputes of ttiis kind. After quoting the provisions of section 4 and 
· 33(1) and remarking that political activity occurs not only between the State and its 
citizens but also between citizen and citizen Judge vah Schalkwyk held !hat the right 
to freedom of expression has direct horizontal application. 128 This dictum supports 
the Values Test in that it recognises the principle that some of; the rights should 
have directhorizontal application. 
127 
128 
Mandela v Falati 1995 0) SA 251 (w). 
Mandela v Falati at p 257 I -·J. 
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6.2 DE KLERK AND ANOTHER v DU PLESSIS AND OTHERS, 129 
The facts of the case are set out below in the discussion of the judgement of the 
· Constitutional Court in this matter. In the High Court Van Dijkhorst J. concluded that 
the fundamental rights set out in the Chapter 3 shall. be of vertical appl!cation 
only. 130 Obviously no support for the Values Test can be found in this judgement. 
6.3. GARDENER v WHITAKER 131 
The Plaintiff, the town clerk of East London sued the Defendant a city councillor for 
defamation because the Defendant in a city council meeting called him a liar. After 
examining the position in Canada, Sri Lanka, Germany and the United States of 
America, Judge Froneman remarked that it was apparent from his survey that 
fundamental rights charters are primarily aimed at safeguarding the rights of 
. . 
individuals against the unjustified intrusion upon those rights by public organs of the 
State.132 These constitutions require that their inherent values systems should 
permeate through the entire legal system. 
Turning to the Interim Constitution the judge remarked that the same applies to it but 
with the qualification that the deepest norms should determine whether in private 
litigation there should be direct horizontal application or indirect horizontal 
application. Judge Froneman stated that the basic concern of the Interim 
'·;.. ' 
Constitution is to transform the South African society into a society based on human 
"· . 
rights and democracy . This would in particular instances call for the direct 






De Klerk and Another v Du Plessis and Others 1995 (2) SA 40 (T). 
De Klerk v Du Plessis at p 49 F. 
Gardener v Whitaker 1995 (2) SA 672 (E). 
Gardener v Whitaker p 683 F. 
Gardener Whitaker at p 684 H. 
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Judge Froneman made the following two significant remarks that can be used to 
support the Guelph Values Test. 
(a) the purpose of the Constitution, viz. to transform the South 
African society, calls for the direct horizontal application of 
certain fundamental rights; 
- (b) whether a right has direct horizontal application depends on the 
value that underlies it. 
I submit that this is direct support for the Values Test as the test is based on these 
two ideas. 
6.4 MOTALA AND ANOTHER v UNIVERSITY OF NATAL 134 
In this case Judge Hurt stated135 that many of the entrenched rights are, by their 
very nature, excf usively "vertical" in their operation and many of the rights, for 
example section 8 rights, have direct horizontal application. Although not stating the 
criteria used for the distinction, support for the Values Test can be found in the 
judge's acknowledgement that some rights have direct horizontal application. 
6.5 BALORO AND OTHERS v UNIVERSITY OF BOPHUTHATSWANA AND 
OTHERS. 136 
-~ 
The applicants in this case were all foreign nationals employed by and lecturing at 
the respondent University . They alleged that the first respondent intended 
discriminating against them by not offering them promotion on the basis of their 




Motala v University of Natal 1995 (3) BCLR 37 4 (D). 
Motala v University of Natal at p 382 G-H. 
Baloro and Others v University of Bophuthatswana and Others .1995 (4) SA 
197. 
- 77 
applicants averred that they are protected from such discrimination and they 
' 
therefore asked the court for a mandamus to that effect. 
Judge President Friedman made a comprehensive examination of the 
vertical-horizontal debate in foreign jurisdictions. Rejecting the approach of Van 
Dijkhorst 137 and approving 138 the approach of Judges Van Schalkwyk, Froneman 
' ~ . 
and Hurt, Judge Friedman concluded that the Bill of Rights does have general 
horizontal application. 139The judge suggested the following test: 140 _ 
"What does appear, however, is a general principle that any activity, 
operation, undertaking or enterprise operating in the community, and 
open to the public, is subject to the horizontal dimension of the said 
rights contained in chap 3 read with ss 33(4) and 35." 
This test is too narrow as it emphasises only the public sphere and loses sight of the 
manner in which the injustices of_ the, past had insinuated themselves even into the 
private spheres of society. 
6.6 DU PLESSIS AND OTHERS v DE KLERK AND ANOTHER , 
The Constitutional Court in Du Plessis and Others v De Kl erk and Another 141 
finally had an opportunity to clarify the application debate. The majority judgmer,t 
was de[ivered by Justice Kentridge: 
,, 
The Pretoria News is a newspaper. During the beginning of 1993 it published 
articles about the supply by air of arms to the Angola rebel movement Unita. These 
articles mentioned by name that a certain Mr De Klerk and his company, Wonder Air 
(Pty) Ltd,- were conducting illegal and pirate flights into Angola to supply the arms. 
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warin Angola for their own personal gain. In consequence to these publications Mr 
De Klerk issued summons claiming damages for defamation in the amount of R750 
000-00 for injury to .his reputation. His company claimed RS million for loss of 
business. 
The Defendants admitted publishing the articles but denied they meant that the 
Plaintiffs were involved in illegal activities. In the alternative the Defendant alleged -
that the general subject of the articles was a matter of public interest. 
During the latter part of 1994 the Defendants brought an application to amend their 
Plea to add a further defence. Their further defence was that publication of the 
article was not unlawful by the reason of the protection given to the Defendants by 
Section 15 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. The 
Plaintiffs objected to this amendment on inter alia the basis that the Constitution has 
no application horizontally. 
Van Dijkhorst,· J heard the application for amendment and refused it inter alia on the 
ground that the Constitution has no horizontal application. On the 9th of June.1994, 
the Constitutional Court granted leave to appeal against this order. The 
Constitutional Court also re-formulated Van Dijkhorst, J's question whether the 
constitution has horizontal application as follows. 
•~re the provisions of chapter 3 of the Constitution - and more particularly 
-~section 15 · - capable of application to any relation other than that between .. 
persons and legislative or executive organs of state at all levels of 
"' 
government. "142 
The Judgment of Justice Kentridge 143 
The majority judgment was delivered by Justice Kentridge. He stated that the 
resolution of the issue must ultimately depend on an analysis ·of the specific 
142 
143 
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provisions of the Constitution. 144 He remarked that it is none the less illuminating to 
examine the solutions arrived at by the courts of other countries. 145 He then 
continued by examining the position in the United. States, Canada, Germany and 
Ireland and he concluded that a comparative examination shows at once that there 
is no universal answer to the problem of vertical or horizontal application of the Bill 
of Rights. 146 The learned Judge st~ted that the application question poses two 
inter-related but none the less different questions. The first was to what law the 
chapter applies. Does it apply to common law or only to statutory law? The second 
question was, who is bound by the chapter?147 
For Justice Kentridge the plain answer to the first question emerged from Section 
7(2) of the Constitution and the plain answer to the second question emerged from 
Section 7(1 ). 148 
He then continued that entrenched Bills of Right are traditionally intended to protect 
the subject against legislative and executive action and that the emphatic statement 
in 7(1) must mean that chapter 3 is intended to be binding only on the legislative 
and the executive organs of the state. If the legislature intended otherwise, it could 
readily have expressed its intention. 
Section 33 (4) also provided a strong indication to Justice Kentridge that general 
horizontal application was not intended. So too does Section 35· (3). The judge 
argued
1
~that both these clauses would have been unnecessary if the fundamental 
rights.Rad direct horizontal application . .. 
.. 
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"a. Constitutional rights under chapter 3 may be invoked against an organ of 
government but not by one private litigant against another. 
b. In private litigation, any litigant may none the less contend that the statute (or 
' . 
executive act) relied on by the other party is invalid as being inconsistent with 
the ,limitations placed on ,the Legislature and Executive under chapter 3. 
c. As chapter 3 applies to common law, governmental acts or omissions in 
reliance on the common law, may be attacked by a private litigant as being 
inconsistent with chapter 3 in any dispute with an organ of government. " 
The learned judge then returned to the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court as set 
out in section 98 of the Interim Constitution. The judge remarked that the operation 
of the declaration of invalidity of a law (wet) is dealt with in sub-section 6, but 
section 98 nowhere provides for a declaration that the rules of common law can be 
declared invalid. Such a declaration' would be highly unusual and could give rise to 
more difficulties, the Judge noted. In short, · the judge concluded that the 
Constitutional Court does not have the jurisdiction to re-write the common law. He 
found that their jurisdiction is not suited to the exposition of principles of private 
law.150 
The judge ruled151 that chapter 3 does not have a >general direct horizontal 
applic~ion but that it may and should have an influence on the development on the 
-.. 
common law . .,, 
He however remarked: 
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necessary implication have direct horizontal application.' Section 15 (1) is 
not such a provision. "152 
Comments 
In coming to the conclusion that the Interim Bill of Rights does not have direct 
horizontal application Justice Kentridge maked the point that section 33(1) could 
hardly be applied in a dispute between two private persons regulated by the 
common law, which law had struck a balance between their competing interests. If 
this is so, the Bill of Rights cannot be applied in a direct horizontal manner. He 
however provides no reasons for this statement. Textually I can find no reason why 
section 33 cannot be invoked153. Surely the common law is a law of "general 
application" as is envisaged by that section. Justice Kentridge had also ruled that if 
the state is a party to the dispute and it relies on the common law, a fundamental 
rig~t can be invoked. Section 33(1) would therefore apply 'in such a dispute. In my 
view, if section 33(1) can be applied to the common law in a public dispute, it can 
be applied to the common law in a private dispute. 
Justice Kentridge stated that section 4(1) does not provide support for the 
horizontalists154 He argued that the statement in this section "any law or act 
inconsistent with its provisions shall ..... be of no force of effect ... " is qualified by 
"unles~otherwise provided expressly or by necessary implication."· This of course is 
a cir~Jlar argument. He uses his conclusion about the application debafe to provide .. ' 
support for his conclusion. The enquiry is to find out what the other provisions 
provide or imply about the application of the fundamental rights. 
Justice Kentridge's finding on the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court is also not 
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jurisdictionover all matters relating to the interpretation, protection and enforcement 
of the provisions of the Constitution. Textually this must mean that the Constitutional· 
Court can change the common law wh~n it infringes on a fundamental right. 155 
The majority decision states that in cases other that section 15, a litigant may argue 
that a fundamental right may still be invoked in a purely private dispute. This leaves 
the door wide open for the Guelph Values Test to be applied. As far as this test is · 
concerned the court only ruled that section 15 is not a right that can promote those 
values that were absent in the old order and which are desired for the new order. 
THE JUDGMENT OF JUSTICE KRIEGLER156 
Delivering a dissenting Judgment, with Justice Didcott concurring, Justice Kriegler 
stated on the application issue that the question to be answered was simply this. 
" Does our constitutional law directly enforce the fundamental right of persons 
proclaimed in ss 8 - 32 of the Constitution only as against the State or in all 
legal relationships?" 157 -
Justice Kriegler began by making the point158 that it is not true that horizontality will 
result in a Orwellian Society in which the all powerful State will control all private 
relationships. He described as "nonsenseP the fear that direct horizontal application 
will haie the result that the tentacles of government will reach into the marketplace, 
'i-. 






"What is more it is malicious nonsense preying on the fears of privileged 
whites, cosseted in the past by laissez faire capitalism thriving _in an 
environment where the black underclass had limited opportunities to share in 
the bounty. I use strong language designedly. The caricature is pernicious, 
See Woolman and Davis at p 372 for an indepth analysis of why Kentridge 
AJ is wrong on this point. 
Du Plessis v De Klerk p 906. 
Du Plessis v De Klerk p 908 F. 
Du Plessis v De Klerk p 909 C-G. 
-83 
it is calculated to enflame public sentiment and to cloud peoples' perception 
of our fledgling Constitutional democracy. Direct horizontalitly is a bogey 
man,"1s9 
. Turning to the provisions of the Constitution, Justice Kriegler stated that the 
preamble and p9stscript clearly sho~ that the framers unequivocally proclaimed 
much more sweeping aims than those identified by the judge a quo and accepted by 
some of his Colleagues. He continued: 
"Our past is not merely one of repressive use of State power. It is one 
of persistent institutionalised subjugation and exploitation of a 
voiceless and largely defenceless majority by a determined and 
privileged minority. The untold · suffering and injustice of which the 
postscript speaks do not refer only to the previous years, not only to 
. Bantu education, group areas, security and the similar legislative tools 
u~ed by the prJvious government. The postscript mentions a divided 
society charactirised by strife and conf_lict. · This is not a reference to 
governmental a tion only, or even primarily"160 
I 
I 
Justice Kriegler then proceeded to demolish the textual arguments amassed by 
Justice Kentridge in support for his conclusions. He remarked that it was common 
cause that nowhere does the constitution say that Chapter 3 only governs the 
relationship between the State and the individual. 161 Referring to Section 4(1) which 
~ . 
states that the Constitution shall be the supreme law of the Republic the Judge 
~ . . . 
noted that perhaps the word "supreme" has.been devalued by overuse and perhaps 
the word "law" has become mundane. Reading Section 4(1) with Section 4(2) it is 
quite clear that all organs of the State are to honour and enforce the supremacy of 
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Turning to Section 7(2) the Judge noted that Chapter 3 shall apply to all the law in 
force. He stated that "all" means "all" and the clear intention of the drafters was to 
expand the scope of Chapter 3 to the widest possible limits that language could 
express. This is further reinforced by Section 7(1 ). 163 
The Judge remarked that Section 7 should be read with Section 33(2). If the ~hapter 
was intended to operate only vertically or only indirectly horizontally why was it 
necessary or indeed appropriate to declaim the reservation of rights in such 
unqualified terms. Justice Kriegler in relation to section 35(3) points out that all this 
section does is to instruct the courts in disputes not involving fundamental right to 
take into account the spirit, purport and values of the Bill of Rights 164. 
Justice Kriegler concluded that the Bill of Rights has general horizontal 
application 165. 
COMMENTS 
The judgmenl of Justice Kriegler does not support the principles of the Guelph 
Values Test. According to him all organs of state are bound. Also bound are all 
persons unconnected with the state if they rely on the law including the common 
law. I however agree with his- view -that the purpose of the Interim Constitution is to 
transform the whole of society and not just the state. The application test he 
propos~s and the Guelph Values Test both have the same aims in mind i.e. the 
·-~ ' 
transformation of society . The real difference between these two tests is that in his 
"· 
test competing values will be weighed up only at the section 33(1) stage whilst in the 
test I propose competing values will be weight up at two points. Firstly when it must 
be determined whether a private person should be bound according to the 
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THE JUDGMENT OF JUSTICE ACKERMANN 166 
The judge opened by stating that the German Basic Law (GBL) was conceived in 
dire circumstances bearing sufficient resemblance to our own to make critical study 
and cautious application of its lessons to our situation and constitution warranted. 167 
. The judge remarke~ that in Germany it is today not seriously questioned that, in 
deciding disputes between private persons, there is no direct application of the 
fundamental rights by the judiciary. He noted that the Federal Constitutional Court 
and academic opinion are in agreement that basic rights only apply with indirect 
horizontality to the legal relationships of private people. The basic rights do not 
apply directly to the private law but because the basic rights also operate as an 
objective value system they influence the private law. Basic rights do not serve to 
solve disputes in the field of private law and specific cases. The judge also made 
the point that the GBL not only establishes subjective individual rights but also an 
objective order of values or an objective value system. 
About the operation in German Constitution Law of mittelbare Drittwirkung the 
learned judge states that the basic rights should have a radiating effect on private 
law relations. 168 Therefore in private litigation the German courts are obliged to 
consider the basic rights in interpreting concepts such as ''justified, wrongfulness, 
contra bones mores, et cetera"169. 
The ~.~ic rights therefore should have a radiating effect on the common law through 
~ . 
provisions such as e.g. Article 138 of the Civil Code which provides that legal acts 
~ . 
which are contrary to public policy are void. Turning to the provisions of the Interim 
Bill of Rights the judge is of the view that there is a marked similarity between the 
above approach and the provisions of Section 35(3). This similarity could not have 
been a coincidence and therefore the legislature intended the German approach to 
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conclusion that direct horizontal application of Chapter 3 to private legal relations is 
not intended. 170 
COMMENTS 
Mittelbare Drittwirkung influences the common law through its ~pen-ended concepts 
like contra bones mores. In my view this method does not give sufficient expression 
to the avowed aims of the Constitution to transform the South African society. 
Judges are also bound by precedent and develop the common law only in very rare 
instances . What if there is not an open-ended concept in the law that applies to the 
dispute? 
THEJUDGMENTOFJUSTICEMADALA 
Justice Madala stated that in his view some of the rights entrenched in the Bill of 
Rights have direct horizontal application. 171 This is what the Values Test part of the 
Guelph Test also states. The Judge examined the underlying values and objects of 
the Constitution by referring to the pre-and postambles. The objects of the 
Constitution, he remarked, are to retain from the past only that which is defensible. 
The purpose of the Constitution is to reject those parts of the past that are 
disgracefully racist, authoritarian, insular, and repressive. The Constitution is aimed 





"In a nutshell, these are the underlying values and objects of the 
, Constitution, these are the imbalance which the Constitution seeks to 
redress. The theme of an open and Democratic society based on 
freedom and equality runs throughout the Bill of Rights - obviously to 
facilitate the transition from an apartheid society to· a democratic 
society"173 
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After asking the question whether the Bill of Right should be applied directly or 
indirectly by means of section 35(3) Madala J stated; 174 
"If the proposition is accepted that the basic concern of the 
Constitution is to transform the South African socie.ty and the legal 
system into one that upholds democratic principles and human rights 
between, inter alia, the State and the individual and between 
individuals inter se, there must be instances which call, in so far as 
private relationships between individuals are concerned for the 
direct application of the provisions of chapter 3 between such 
individuals. As a matter of interpretation, certain provisions of the 
chapte~ have direct horizontal application. We should examine every 
enumerated right and decide whether it can sensibly be applied in the 
private domain. In support of this approach, it all depends on the . 
nature and extent of the particular right, the values that underlie -
it, and the context in which the alleged breach of the right 
occurs." 
This dictum of Justice Madala is direct support for the Values leg of the Guelph 
Values Test. He stated clearfy ( in th_ose portions I have made bold ) that some 
rights should have direct horizontal application and that the values that underlie the 
Constitbtion should be an important factor that should be taken into account in ~- . . 
deciding..the issue. 
THE JUDGMENT OF JUSTICE MAHOMED. 
Justice Mahomed concurred with the judgment of Justice Kentridge. It is however 
important to note that he said: 175 
174 
175 
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"The issue which arises in the present case is to be confined to the 
proper application of section 15 and the answer to that issue may not 
necessarily be the same as the answer which might have to be given 
to any other section contained in chapter 3 .. (There is some force in 
the suggestion by Madala J that some of the fundamental rights 
enumerated in chapter 3 may apply directly in litigation between 
private persons.)" 
Justice Mahomed then refers to the passage from the judgment of Justice Madala 
quoted above. 
I suggest that from the above quotation it can be inferred that Justice Mahomed will 
support the direct application of certain fundamental rights in a purely private 
dispute if the decision as to whether the right should so apply is made with 
reference to the values and objects which underlie the Constitution. 
To conclude, the finding of the Court in this case is not in conflict with the Guelph 
Values Test. Both Justice Madala and Justice Mahomed openly support the Values 
Test. Justice Kentr_idge and the judges that concurred with him left open the 
possibility that the Values Test might still be applied. The judgment of Justice 
Kriegler and Justice Didcott also supports the idea, like the Guelph Values Test, 
that transformation of the whole of society was intended by the Constitution. To give 
expres$ion to this aim fundamental rights should have direct horizontal application. 
--~-
6.7 HOLOMISAV ARGUS NEWSPAPERS L TD176 
In May 1993 the Star Newspaper published a report about the Plaintiff under the 
heading "Holomisa is linked to infiltration of APLA hit squad". This report alleged 
that the Plaintiff _was directly involved in the infiltration into South Africa of an 
176 1996 (6) BCLR 836 (W)and also 1996 (2) SA 588 (W) . Very instructive is the 
discussion by Stuart Woolman Defamation, Application and the Interim 
Constitution: An Unqualified and Direct Analysis of · Holomisa v Argus 
Newspapers Ltd (1996) 113 SALJ 428. 
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AZAPO hit squad with the aim of killing whites in the Northern Natal Region. At that 
time the Plaintiff was the military ruler of the Transkei. The Plaintiff issued 
summons in the amount of a R100 000-00 against the Argus Newspaper group. · 
In answering the question whether fundamental rights applies between private 
parties, Judge. Cameron stated that, the reference to the judiciary in. section 4(2) and 
the absence thereof in 7(1) has the unmistakable implication that the judicial organ 
of state is not bound in the same way by the chapter on fundamental rights as the 
legislature and executive. 177 For the Judge this inference is strengthened by section 
33(4).178 
Judge Cameron notes that these clauses also make it plain that the Constitution 
envisages that certain bodies and persons would not without further legislative 
provision or further development of the common law be bound by the fundamental 
. rights. 179 After stating that the Bill of Rights does not apply in a unqualified horizontal 
manner he concluded that the chapter was intended to apply in some manner to all 
disputes between litigating parties. 180 
Judge Cameron found that section 35(3) is not merely an interpretative directive but .. 
a force that informs all legal institutions and decisions with the new power of 
constitutional values. 181 He stated that in this very practical sense it will be improper 
to consider the defences available to the Defendant in a defamation action without 
taking tnto account as between Defendant and Plaintiff the fact that section 15(1) 
~ . 
guarant~es every person the right to freedom of speech and expression. After 
examining th~ South African Law of Defamation, Judge Cameron stated that the 
directive in section 35(3) requires the fundamental reconsideration of any common 
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Judge Cameron also had no problem in using section 33(1) in balancing competing 
values in a common ,law scenario. r_le said that the procedure is essentially similar to 
the one when enquiring whether a. statute has infringed a private person's rights. 
The court must first determine the meani~g and content of the right sought to be 
asserted. It must then assess whether rules of common law or otherwise which 
protect the one right, curtail or infringe upon the enjoyment of the other. If so,. it must 
determfne whether in the light of the constitutional scheme overall, and the relative 
place of each competing right in it, that infringement _can be justified under the 
limitation provision. At both stages there will necessarily be an assessment of 
competing values. 183 
Judge Cameron then proceeded to look at the common law right of free speech and 
the common law right of dignity and came to the conclusion that the Appellate 
Division's exposition of the common law gives supremacy to the value of reputation 
over freedom of speech. The values however which underlie t~e Interim Cor:,stitution 
prefer freedom of speech over the right to dignity. Therefore the common law in this 
- -
regards needs reformulating. After examining many different formulations of the 
new common law rule, Judge Cameron concluded: 
"That a defamatory statement which relates to free and fair political activity is 
constitutionally protected even if false unless the Plaintiff shows that in all the 
circumstances of its publication it was unreasonably made."184 
~-
'"1-. 
I agree ~ith the order made by Judge Cameron but the method used by him can 
surely not be described as mittelbare Drittwirkung. Indirect application takes place 
when the courts use the open-ended concept of the common law like unlawfulness, 
contra bones mores, negligence and others to infuse the underlying values of the 
Constitution into the common law. The disadvantage of the method used by Judge 
Cameron is that the precedent system will make it very difficult for other judges to 
follow his example. 
183 
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6.8. RYLAND v EDRO5185 
Plaintiff instituted an action against Defendant claiming her eviction from their home 
where they had lived for some years after their marriage by ~uslim rights. The 
marriage had terminated some years earlier in accordance with Islamic law. The 
. Eviction Claim was ultimately settled. What remained to be -determined was 
Defendant's claim in reconvention for a part of the Plaintiff's estate. Relying on the 
contractual relationship arising· from their Muslim marriage, Defendant sought a 
monthly maintenance, a conciliatory gift as result of the dissolution of the marriage, 
and the transfer, alternatively payment of, an equitable share of the increase in 
Plaintiff's estate. 
The court had to decide whether it was precluded by what had been held in Ismail v 
Ismail 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A) from enforcing the terms of the contract arising from 
the Muslim marriage. That decision had held that the recognition of a potentially. 
polygamous union celebrated according to the tenets and customs of Muslim faith 
- -
was contrary to public policy, as was the enforcement of the consequences of such 
a union. Judge Farlam referred to the Du Plessis v De Klerk and the judgement of 
Ackermann J in setting out the German principle of "mittelbare drittwirkung"186 ... 
Farlam J stated that it was clea,r that the spirit, purport and objects of chapter 3 of 
the Constitution and the basic· values which underlie it were in conflict with the view 
as to public policy expressed and applied · in the Ismail case. He stated that 
theret~te the values underlying chap~er 3 of the constituti~n must prevail. These 
values Ile identified to be, for the purposes of this case, equality , tolerance of 
diversity, ana the recognition of the plural nature of our society. 187 The judge 
further agreed that it is quite inimical to all the values. of the new South Africa for 
one group to impose its values on another and that ttie court should only brand a 
contract as offensive to public policy if it is offensive to those values which are 
shared by the community at large. The· judge then concluded that in these 
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the Appellate Division, could no longer operate to preclude him from enforcing the 
terms of a marriage contract concluded by Muslim Personal law. 
It is important to note th~t no constitutional issue was raised by the parties in their 
pleadings. The fact that the contract relied upon was against public policy was 
raised by the advocates in argument. 188 No party based any of their claims in the, Bill 
of Rights. This case provides an example of what the legislature intended with the 
provision of section 35(3) . This section should be used, in disputes where no 
Constitutional claim is made, to conform the common law to the values which 
underlie the Constitution. If this is so, surely the legislature must have intended that 
if. a claim based on the Bill of Rights is made, another mechanism should be 
followed to enforce such a claim. This in my view is a pointer that the legislature 
must have intended some forms of direct horizontal application. 





I will now proceed to explore academic opinion on the application debate. I will 
attempt not only to find support for the Guelph Values Test but also to point to the 
different interpretations given to the provisions of the Interim Constitutions rnlating 
to the application debate. 
7.1 MARTIN BRASSEY189 
Brassey states that according to the provisions of section 33(4)190 of the Interim 
Constitution it is clear that some people fall beyond the reach of section 7(1 ). He 
states that those not bound can only be the Judiciary and private persons. 
· Whether the judiciary is bound, Brassey states, must be discovered from section 7. 
$ection 7(1) does not mention the judiciary. This omission, he argues, could not 
have been an error considering the sections drafting history and that the judiciary is 
specifically mentioned in section 4. The purpose of the omission was to curtail the . 
breadth of section 7(1 ). Brassey concludes that in certain capacities the judiciary is 
bound and in others not. 192 
. ~ 
Brass_ey moreover holds the view that Chapter 3 does not apply in a dispute 
~ . . 
between..private parties. 193 To come to this conclusion he argues that Section 7(1) 
should be read as qualifying section 7(2) and that the Bill of Rights only applies to 
the common law once it is established that an entity is bound in terms of the 
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_In my \i'iew there is nothing in the text that support this. "qualification" explanation. 
, . 
The language chosen in the section very clearly reads that chapter 3 applies to "all 
law in ~orce". Taking into account the other interpretive principles195 as set out in 
chapter 2 it becomes even harder to read into that section the above qualification. 
These principles, inter alia, require that the interpretation given to section 7(2) 
should secure for the individual the full protection of the .Bill of Rights: 196 Another 
interpretive principle _states that one should take into account the larger object and 
purpose of the Constitution, viz. to transform society. 197 This purpose demands that 
section 7(1) should not qualify section 7(2). Transformation of society includes the 
transformation of the relationships between private persons. Section 7(2) in my view 
points to a direct horizontal application of the Bill of Rights. 198 
Secondly Brassey argues that the omission in 7(1) of the reference to private 
persons cannot be explained away as . the product of inadvertence. Horizontalists 
can however argue that private persons are·not bound in terms of section 7(1 ). They 
are bound in terms of section 7(2). They are bound because the Bill of Rights shall 
apply to all law. The law does not exist in a vacuum. The law exists because it 
regulates relationships between persons. Because of the purpose and function of 
the law, to which the Constitution applies, private persons are bound. 
Thirdly Brassey argues that section 33(1) points to the fact that the Bill of Rights 
does, not have direct horizontal application. He states that this clause is a 
""i--. 
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balancing competing interests. , He states that the w~rding of the section makes it 
available only to the st~te; 
" ....... for its operation depends on the exercise of a power that no private 
' . 
person enjoys, the power to make a law of general application"199 
Section 33(1 ), however, does not state that a person's right may be limited only by 
a law passed by the state. The section never mentions what the origin of the law 
limiting the right should be . The only requirement is that the law must be a law of 
general application. Obviously the common law is a law of general application. If the 
owners of a shopping centre therefore, in the exercise of their common law right of 
ownership, decide that they will forbid the distribution of religious pamphlets in their 
. shopping centre, the religious group can claim that their rights to freedom of speech 
and freedom of religion have been infringed . They can approach the court for an 
order declaring the owners' ruling invalid. The court can then .consider whether the 
common law regarding ownership of property is justified in terms of section 33(1 ). 
In my view chapter 3 right can be limited by a rule of common law. 200 
Brassey does not support the Guelph Values Test. Some of the arguments he uses . 
to support his proposition that private persons are not bound are open to criticism. 
7.2. ANNEL VAN ASWEGEN201 
Van Aswegan points out that horizontal application of the Bill of Rights can take 
place either ".directly or indirectly. She explains the concept of indirect horizontal 





Kriegler J in Du Plessis v De Klerk stated on p 915 F " A rule of common law 
which , for example, infringes a person's right to privacy or human dignity can 
be saved if it meets the s 33(1) requirements. Mahomed J on p896 A _also 
agrees with Kriegler J on this point as he states that s 33(1) would in any 
event apply on the verticalist's view when for example the state rely on the 
common law and that law is in conflict with fundamental right. 
Annel Van Aswegan The Implications of a Bill of Rights for the law of 
Contract and Delict (1995) 11 SAJHR p 50. 
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' 
terms of this doctrine the provisions of the Grundgesetz have no direct application to 
private law relations. Private law relations .are regulated by the provisions of the 
German _Civil Code. The general clauses in the German Civil Code, embodying the 
principles of good faith and good mora·ls, which play a major role in the continued 
development and adaptation of the provisions of the German Civil Code, have to be 
interpreted and applied to reflect the standards set by the basic rights protected in 
the Grudgesetz. Van Aswegen further states that the interpretation by the courts of 
all legislation including that governing private Jaw relations, has to be undertaken to 
give maximum effect to an objective system of values extracted from the provisions 
of the Grundgesetz. This she states has the effect of indirectly subjecting all private 
law rules and principles to the basic values of the bill of rights. 202 
The author states that section 35(1) of the Interim Bill of Rightsexpressly adopts the 
German Drittwirking model. 203 From this adoption the following consequences follow 
for her: 
a. The open-ended principles in the common law, such as the 
contractual contra bonos mores principle and the delictual 
unlawfulness concept should be radiated by the underlying 
values of our Interim Bill of Rights 
b. Rules of common law must be interpreted in accordance' with 
the values embodied in the Interim Constitution. 204 
Applying indirect Drittwirkung to the law of delict the author states that the tests for 
wrongfullness, causation and negligence are classical open-ended concepts and 
can be used to import constitutional values into the common law. 205 The law of · 
contract on the other hand, apart from the concept of "contrary to public policy", 






Van Aswegen p 52. 
Van Aswegen p 56. 
ibid. 
Van Aswegen p 60: 
Van Aswegen p 65 states " In fact the general principles of contractual 
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In coming to the. conclusion that the Interim Bill of Rights does not have direct 
horizonta_l application, 207 Van Aswegan argues that section 7(1) makes it clear that 
fundamental rights only binds the state. 208 . Therefore, she argues, section 33(2) 
which prohibits the limitation of any fundamental right by the common law also 
applies only to the common law relationship if the state is involved. 
The argument of the author that the Interim Bill of Rights should only have indirect 





a. the avowed objects of the Interim Constitution (as set out in the 
Preamble and Postamble) are to transform the South African society. 
b. section 4(1 ), which states that the Constitution shall be the supreme 
law and any act ( "enige handeling" in the afrikaans version) 
inconsistent with its provisions shall-be bf no force or effect. To my 
mind "any act" includes the acts of a person in a purely private 
. -
dispute. 
c. section 7(2) which states that the Bill of Rights shall apply to all law in 
force . 
. cl , the principles of constitutional interpretation as set out in chapter 2 209. 
-ii-. 
e. '.~action 35(3) can also be interpreted to mean that in a dispute where 
no constitutional issue is raised the court must follow the dictates of 
that section. 
liability consist for the most part of very precise, detailed rules with a fixed 
area of application." 
Van Aswegan. p 53. 
Van Aswegan p 53 and p 55. 
See page 6 and 7 of this thesis. 
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f. section 33(2) states that no law shall limit any fundamental right. This 
points to a direct horizontal application of the Bill of RighJs. The· 
section also states that this rule shall apply unless another provision of 
the Constitutiona provides otherwise. As was pointed out by Justice 
Kriegler there is no provision in the Interim Constitution which states 
"that chapter 3 only governs the relationship between the State and 
the individual"2~0 
7.3 JOHAN DE WAAL211 
De Waal makes the unsubstantiated statement that the Bill of Right does not have 
direct horizontal application. 212 As he does not advance any argument in support of 
his statement I will not repeat the arguments advanced in favour of direct horizontal 
application. He remarks that the omission of the judiciary in section 7(1) of the 
interim bill was clearly aimed at avoiding the consequences of Shelley v Kramer. 213 
He concluded that if in a private dispute the common law infringes on one's rights 
one should be entitled to invoke the Bill of Rights. Once a judge has however made 
a court order enforcing that common law principle one cannot challenge the court 
order itself as infringing one's constitutional rights. 
7.4 DE WET214 
De Wet submits thats 7(1) read in conjunction with s 35(3) is an incorporation by . -~ . . 








Du Plessis v De Klerk p 912 I - 913 A. 
Johan de Waal A Comparative Analysis of the Provisions of German Origin 
in the Interim Bill of Rights (1995) 11 SAJHR 1. 
De Waal p 9. 
De Waal p 10. 
Erika De Wet Indirect Drittwirkung and the Application clause: A reply to 
· Johan De Waal by Erika de Wet (1995) 11 SAJHR 610. . 




"The German constitutional court explicitly ruled that the constitutional rights 
primarily exist between the individual and the state. However, as has been 
mentioned, these rights also envisage an objective value system which would 
apply to the whole legal system. Consequently all norms of private law , 
criminal law, commercial law and the law of procedure must reflect the values 
underlying constitutional rights, and le_gislation in conflict with this is null and 
void."216 
De Wet states that De Waal's conclusions (that the common law but not the 
judiciary's rulings on the common law is subject to constitutional review) is 
problematic for three reasons. One reason is that the common law is created by 
judges and their court orders. If one therefore finds that the common law is subject 
to charter review then surely the judges orders must also be. The author continues 
that the binding of the judiciary as feared by De Waal -is not the danger it is made 
out to be. According to her, the real danger is the sphere of private law to which the 
bill of rights should apply. The question to be answered according to De Wet is 
whether the bill of rights should be applied to civil as well as non-civil private law. 217 
Civil private law concerns state law (legislation as well as common law) whereas 
non-civil private law refers to the law of private institutions such as churches and 
sports societies. 
Disagreeing with De Waal on the direct application of the interim bill of 'rights, De 
Wet ~tates that in certain instances in German jurisprudence where the objective of 
~ . 
the right~would be undermined if not applied directly , direct application of a 
fundamental '~ight is acknowledged. 218 The author concludes by remarking that it 
cannot be excluded that the court could infer rights and obligations for private 
individuals directly from the Constitution in cases where the nature and aim of the 
constitutional rights so demand, and the existing law is too vague to provide a clear 





De Wet p 612. 
De Wet p 614. 
De Wet p 616, 617 and 619. 
De Wet p 619. , 
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7.5 STUART WOOLMAN220 _ 
The author made an in-depth study of the application debate. He points to all t_he 
textual arguments that can be advanced for horizontal, vertical, and indirect 
horizontal application of the bill of rights221 and concludes that the text does not 
settle the debate. 222 Woolman points out that the vertical approach is open to 
severe critidsm. Firstly he demonstrates that whether a right will have application 
depends fortuitously on the forms it takes. If it is in the form of the common law it will 
not be subject to review whilst if in the form of a statute, it will. I agree with him and 
believe that the Guelph Values Test will address this problem. Whether the Guelph 
values test applies depends not on the form the law takes but on the values which 
underlie the constitution. 
Secondly he points out that a vertical approach will lead to "a neurotic search for the 
state". 223 The -end result will be an incoherent body _of case law.224 The Guelph 
Values Test will address this problem in that the court must consider the values of 
the constitution and evaluate the· conflicting interest in applying the fundamental 
rights. This will lead to a substantive vision of the law and a law based on principled __ 
decisions 
Thirdly Woolman points out that the judiciary should be bound as it is part of the 
state __ even when it judges disputes. The Guelph Values Test also subscribes to this 
~- . . 
principle.. 
Fourthly, Woolman points out that the public/private distinction perpetuated by the 
verticalists is unacceptable as it is based on 17th century natural law jurisprudence. 
Verticalists ignore the principles of the positivist school of thought which declares 






Chaskalson Chapter 11. 
Woolman in Chaskalson at p 10-8 and 10-31 . 
above at 10-8. 




the behaviour225. The ,Guelph Values Test ;states that only those rights that can 
promote the values envisaged for the new South Africa should ha~e direct horizontal 
application. It therefore does not make a public/private distinction. 
Criticising the horizontal approach, Woolman points out that all personal disputes 
will be. subjected to constitutional review thereby creating a totalitarian state. 
Unelected judges will tell us how to behave and how not.226 This also flies in the face 
of our hard fought demo.cracy. The response of the Guelph values test is that not all 
fundamental rights will have direct horizontal application. Those rights that are 
applied are needed for the transformation of the South African society. 
7.6 CACHALIA ET AL. 
The authors hold the view that the Bill of Rights predominantly should be applied in 
a vertical fashion. 227 
7.7 DU PLESSIS AND CORDER. 228 
The authors state that the Bill is predominantly vertical in operation. Organs of state 
should be interpreted as widely. as possible to include bodies established by statute 
as organs of government. Also included should be bodies <?r institutions established 
by statute but managed and maintained mainly through private initiative like law 






'.'.'Whether a body or functionary is an organ of state will depend largely 
on the extent to which it is integrated into the structures of authority in 
the state rather than on the nature of the statutory source to which it· 
owes its existence." 229 
above at p 10-20 
above at p 1 0-36 
Cachalia Cheadle, Davis Haysom, Maduna and Marcus; Fundamental Rights 
in the New Constitution 1ed (1994) Juta & Co Ltd p 20. 
Du Plessis and Corder p 110. 
Du Plessis and Corder p 110. 
.I 
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These views of the learned authors support a interpretation very similar to the 
Guelph Test. 
7.8 THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW COMMISSION 
The commission is of the view that: 
"Chapter 3 of the Constitution predominantly operates on the vertical level. "230 
7.9 SASSON 
He holds the view that many of_ the provisions in the Constitution indicate that the 
Bill has horizontal application as well. 231 
7.10 CONCLUSION 
In the academic world the debate is fierce. Some support the German model of .. 
mittelbare Drittwirkung. Some claim that only certain rights have direct horizontal 
application. There is support for the common law to be radically transformed along 
the contours of the bill of rights. Woolman on the other hand supports direct 
horizorltal application of all rights232. Apart from De Wet and Du Plessis and Corder 
"i-. ' 





South African Law Commission p 121. 
Dion Sasson South Africa's Interim ·Constitution 1 ed 
Chaskalson Constitutional Law of South Africa 
Woolman. 
(1994) Juta & Co Ltd 
Chapter 11 by Stuart 
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· CHAPTER 8 
THE FINAL CONSTITUTION 
. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH 
AFRICA 
ACT 108 OF 1996 
Some fundamental changes were made in the Final Constitution233 to the clauses 
dealing with the application issue234. The changes also open up for debate the 
questions that were thought settled by the Constitutional Court in the Du Plessis . -





8. (1) The Bill of Rights applies ·to all law, and binds the legislature, 
the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state. 
(2) A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic 
person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into 
account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty 
imposed by the right." 
The Bill of Rights is set out in chapter 2 of the Final Constitution. 
Cheadle and Davis p 54. 
Woolman S and Davis D The Last Laugh states on page 380 and I quote 
"The language of the Bill of Rights in the final Constitution pulls out the 
primary textual pegs from which hang Acting Justice Kentridge's argument 
regarding the application of the Chapter on Fundamental Fights in the interim · 
Constitution." See Chapter 6 for the discussior, of the Du Plessis case. 
/ 
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8.1. SECTION 8 (1) 
As in the previous clause 7(1) the legislature as well as th_e executive is-bound . 
What is new is the fad that the Bill of Rights ':'PPlies to "all laws" and "the judiciary". 
The inclusion of the judiciary has the effect that one of the verticalists' most powerful 
arguments is shot down. That argument stated that the legislature, by omitting. the 
judiciary in 7(1 ), had intended to insulate the common law, thereby intending a 
vertical reading of clause 7. All court orders will now have to pass constitutional 
muster236 thereby in effect subjecting all purely private disputes, where one party 
resorts to the law, to constitutional scrutiny. 
8.2. SECTION 8 (2) 
Whereas nothing was mentioned in the Interim Bill of Rights about the application 
of the Bill to private persons, the Final Bill of Rights makes it clear that all private 
persons are bound_ in some disputes with other private persons. This section·· 
indicates that the Bill of Rights will have direct horizontal applications.237 
What meaning should be given to the phrase "if, and to the extent that it is . 
applicable"? The word "if' suggests that the Constitutional Court must still determine 
which rights will have direct horizontal application. "If' can theoretically mean either 
that all the rights have direct horizontal application or that some of them shall have 
direct norizontal application. It is however unlikely that the legislature would have -.. . ' 
intended all the rights to have direct horizontal application in the light of the formula 
laid down in'.,this section . The phrase "to the extent that" means that the factual 
. situation within which the right seeks to be applied should be examined. The facts of 
one situation can require the application of a right while the same right in another 
236 
237 
Stuart Woolman Defamation, Application and the Interim Constitution p 450 
states "Put another way, because the Bill of Rights binds the judiciary and all 
its actions- even where there may be no express rule governing a particular 
private relationship and dispute - when any dispute makes it to court , the 
court "must" apply the dictates of the Bill of Rights in resolving the dispute, 
and if nec·essary, formulate and articulate a new rule of common law. 




set of facts might have no direct horizontal application. For the Values Test it means 
that the values must be factual!Y located. The phrase "if ... it is applicable" further 
means if the right is capable of and suitable for direct horizontal application238• In 
deciding whether a right is suitable to bind a natural person the court should take -
into account: 
a. the nature of the right 
b. the nature of the duties imposed by it. 
The courts are instructed to take into account the nature of the right , but what is the 
nature of a right? To find the answer one must look at whether a similar right has 
been used in the past to regulate relationships between private persons. If it was so 
used in the past in the common law or legislation, it will be a good indication that the 
right is suitable for direct horizontal application. For example section ~6(1) states 
that everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right has been 
recognised in the common law as applicable to private relationships in the law of 
defamation. The nature of .the right to freedom of expression is such that it can be 
applied ·to purely private disputes. 
On the other hand section 20 of the Bill of Rights which states that no citizen may 
be deprived of citizenship is not a right found in relationships between private 
persons. 
·i-. 
As far as the_, nature of the duty is concerned the court must take into account firstly 
whether the duty is one that can be owed by one private person to another. Once 
again a good indication will be whether such a duty has been placed on a private 
person by the common law or statutory law. The court should also take into account 
how onerous it is. · 
238 Cheadle and Davis p 57. 
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I: submit that the Court should not take into account only these above-mentioned 
factors. in determining the suitability of a right for. direct horizontal application. An 
additional important factor and of course the starting point of the enquiry should be 
what are the values which the Constitution desires should be present in the new 
South Africa. Section 39(1) specifically instructs the courts that the values that 
underlie an open and democratic society should be promoted when interpreting the, 
application provisions. If the fundamental right under scrutiny can promote these 
essential values, the right should have direct horizontal application. What are. the 
values that the court should promote? The following clauses give some indication of 
the essential values that underlie our Final Constitution. Section 1 for example 
states: 
"Republic of South Africa 
1. The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state 
founded on the following values:( I inserted the bold) . · 
a. Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the 




Non-racialism and non-sexism. 
Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law. 
Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular 
elect/ans and a multi-party system of democratic government, to 
ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness." 
Section 7 (1) reads as follows; 
"Rights 
7:(1) This Bill of Rights 'is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. It 
enshrines. the rights of all people in our country and affirms the democratic 
values of human dignity, equality and freedom." 
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These are the values which must be promoted by the Bill of Rights. These values 
. should be tak~n into ·account when determining whether a particular right should be 
applied directly in a purely private dispure in terms of clause 8(2). 239 
The text of a specific right should of course be looked at240. Section 9( 4) is, for 
example, a section where the text makes it plain that .the right should hav~ direct 
horizontal application. 
Another important factor to be taken into account will be the particular facts of a 
case. The facts of a particular case can demand that, in certain circumstances and 
to give expression to the values of the Constitution, the rights should be applied in 
a direct horizontal manner. The same right might not be so applied in a different set 
of facts. 
A further important factor is that Section,71 (1) of the Interim Constitution stated that 
the Bill of Rights in the new constitution shall ..... "comply with the constitutional 
principles contained in schedule 4". If therefore the principles in schedule 4 indicate 
that a right should have direct horizontal application such a right should be so 
interpreted in terms of section 8(2) as the Constitutional Court has certified that the 
Final Bill of Rights complies with the principles in schedule 4. 
On'ce the court has completed this test as set out in section 8(2) and it has found 
that a rtght is applicable between two private persons it must then give expression to -~, . 
that right by following the procedure set out in section 8(3)241 . 
8.3. SECTION 8 (3) 
This section sets out the method that the court must follow when applying a 
. . 




Cheadle and Davis p 60 
Cheadle and Davis at p 57 
Cheadle and Davis at p 61 
' 
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"(3) When applying a provisi~n of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic 
person in terms of subsection (2), a court-
(a) - in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if 
necessary . develop, the common law to the extent that 
legislation does not give effect to that right; and 
(b) may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided 
that the limitation is in accordance with section 36(1 )" 
The word "must" in this clause commands the courts to create causes of action to 
give expression to fundamental rights. There can therefore be little doubt that the 
Final Bill of Rights provides for substantial direct horizontal application. In applying_ 
this clause the court must first determine if there is not legislation in place securing 
the constitutional right for the aggrieved party. If such legislation exists the 
constitutional right must be expressed by applying the statute. If no such legislation 
exists the court should then apply the common law to give expression to that right. If 
no such common law rule exists the court must develop the common law to give 
expression to the content of the constitutional right. Cheadle and Davis point out · 
the following underlying reasons for this rule: 
... 
(a) it ensures the integrity of the common law. 
(b) it ensures a rule-based response to conduct that violates 
constitutional rights. 
(c) once a rule was established, any further cases in respect of that· 
rule would no longer be constitutional litigation. 
( d) the common law has an existing body of rules concerning 
standing, proof, relief, and assessment of damages that would 




( e) the development of common-law rules and the careful balancing 
of right is what common-law courts do well 242 
The court may further give expression to a limitation of a fundamental right by 
developing a common law rule that limits that right if the commqn law rule complies 
with the provisions of section 36(1) It is here that the court will have to- perform a 
proper balancing of rights and values. 
8.4. CLAUSE 9 - THE EQUALITY CLAUSE 
242 
The equality clause states; , 
"9. (1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal 
protection and benefit of the law. 
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and 
freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality, legislative 
and other measures designed to protect or advance pers'ons, or _ 
categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination 
may be taken. 
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly 
against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, 
gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, 
colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, 
belief, culture, language and birth. 
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against 
anyone on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). 




National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair 
discrimination. 
(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in 
subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that the 
discrimination is fair. 11 
From the word_ing of clause 9.4 alone it is clear th~t this right should have direct 
horizontal application in a private dispute only regulated by the common law. 
8.5. SECTION 39 
This section states 
11(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court tribunal or forum-
l. 
a must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom; 
b must consider international law; and 
c may consider foreign law. 
(4,) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common 
'Jaw or customary law every court , tribunal or forum must promote the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 11 
Section 39 is also an important clause and gives an indication of how the application 
issue should be dealt with. When interpreting the application provisions of the Bill 
of Rights, the court must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. If these values demahd a 
direct horizontal application of a specific right, then the right should ~e so applied. 
/ 
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8.6. CLAUSE 173 - INHERENT POWER 
Clause 173 states the following. 
"173. The Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and High Courts 
have the inherent power to protect and regulate their own process, and 
to develop the common law,. taking into account the interests of 
justice." 
This section cures the difficulties that Justice Kentridge had in the Du Plessis case 
with giving the bill of rights direct horizontal application. His arguments were largely 
based on the fact that the Constitutional Court has no jurisdiction to develop the 
common law. 243 
8.7. SCHEDULE 6 - CLAUSE 17 - CASES PENDING BEFORE COURTS 
This clause reads as follows: 
"All proceedings which, were pending before a court when the new 
Constitution took effect, must be disposed of as if the new Constitution ,had 
not been enacted, unless the interests of justice require otherwise." 
I suggest that the provisions of the Interim Constitution will remain with us for some 
_ time to come., In the light of the radical departure from the Interim Constitution in the 
Final Constitution on the application issue, I suggest that the new Constitution will, 
have a some effect on the interpretation of the Interim Constitution. All the ·. 
provisions in the Interim Constitution may therefore be interpreted in a manner that 
favours a direct horizontal application of specific rights. 




The Final Bill of Rights and the Guelph Values Test 
The question that I will examine in this Chapter is whether the Guelph Values Test 
-can be applied within the framework of the Final Constitution. The Guelph Values 
Test prescribes that the following enquiries should be conducted to determine 
whether the right in question should have direct horizontal application: 
9.1 If the offending entity is not obviously part of the state the court should 
determine whether or not the state is in some obscure manner involved with 
the offending entity. This the court does by asking the following questions; 
a. Does the legislative, executive or administrative branch of government 
exercise control over the entity in question'? 
b. Does the entity perform a traditional government function or a function ·· 
which in more modern times is recognised as a responsibility of the 
state? 
Is the entity one that acts pursuant to statutory authority specifically 
granted to it to enable it to further an objective that government seeks 
to promote in the broader public interest? 
In my view section 8(1) read with the definition "organ of state" as set out in section 
239 provides ample scope for this part of the Guelph Values Test to be applied. 
Note that the provisions in sections 8(2) and 8(3) will not apply in such a case. The 
provisions of section 7(2), which state that the state must respect, protect, promote 
and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights, then become of primary importance. 244 
244 For a detailed discussion of what the word " respect, protect, promote and 
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9.2 If the State is not involved then the values which the Constitution and more 
specifically the Bill of Rights desire for the new order should be identified. It 
should be determined whether those values were absent in the old order. If 
they were absent then the values are ones that can transform our society. 
(essential values) Next it should be determined whether the infringed right in 
question can promote the essential values in the factual context of the case. 
If the right can promote essential values then it becomes an right essential for 
transformation and for the society envisaged by the Constitution. 
In comparison, section 8(2) requires that the right must be suitable245 for and 
capable of direct horizontal application. The court must ask the question: Is this 
right suitable and capable to be applied in a dispute between two private persons 
taking into account the nature of the right and the duty imposed by it.? In answering 
this question the court can also take into accountwhat the values are that is desired 
for the new order, whether they were absent from the old order , and whether the 
infringed right is a right that can promote the essential values the Constitution 
envisaged for the new society. On this point Cheadle and Davis246 state as follows: 
"Where there is uncertainty, the enquiry into suitability will be 
determined by an examination of the right viewed within the context of 
analysis of the right within the overall conception of the Constitution. 
The court must then seek justification in the overall values of the 
Constitution - Openness, democracy, dignity, equality and freedom." 
Also on the same page the authors state: 
245 
246 
fulfil" means see Pierre De Vos Pious Wishes or Directly Enforceable Human 
rights?: Social and Economic rights in South Africa's 1996 Contitution (1997) 
13 SAJHR 67 p 78. 
Cheadle and Davis p 57. 
Cheadle and Davis p 60. 
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"The fundamental values of the Constitution should act as guidelines 
to. which rights are suitable to promote applicatfon because they 
enhance the kind of society envisaged in the Constitution." 
I submit that within the provision of section 8 of the Final Constitution there is ample 
scope for applying thjs portion of the Guelph Values Test. 
9.3 The next requirement of ·the Guelph Values Test is that the right, when it 
complies with the requirement as set out in clause 9.2, will have general 
horizontal application. 
In section 8(3) the Final Constitution states that once the court has determined that 
a fundamental right applies to a natural or juristic person then effect must be given 
to the right. Effect is given by applying legislation that can ensure enforcement of 
. the fundamental right or by applying the common law or by developing the common . 
. law by creating causes of action and defences. The Constitution prescribes, like the 
Guelph Values Test, that once a right is found suitable it must be applied in a direct 
horizontal manner. 
CONCLUSION 
The Guelph Values Test is supported by the text of the Final Constitution. The only 
modification to the Guelph Values Test is that one should, apart from examining the 
~ . 
values tt}at the right can promote, also consider the following ; 
1. The nature of the right 
2 The nature of the duties that it imposes. 
3 The text setting out the right. 
4 The facts of a specific case 
-115 
The Guelph Values Test can further fulfil. another very important function. The Bill of 
Rights now provides for two methods of expressing Constitutional rights. The one 
method is when the state is involved and when the rights are applicable to the State 
as envisaged t;,y section 8(1 ). In this regard Section 7 (2) states; 
"The state must respect , protect, promote, and fulfil the rights in the 
Bill of Rights 
The other method is when a natural or juristic person is involved. Then the 
fundamental right must be applied as is set out in clause 8(3). The content of the 
right must be expressed _through existing legislation, the common law or the 
development of the common law. These two sets of potential obligations are very 
different in nature and aims. The Guelph Values Test in my view is a principle.d test 
and its principles will ensure that a fair distinction is made between persons 
connected to the state and bound by section 8( 1 ) and private persons bound by 
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